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ABSTRACT 
Healthcare providers have a responsibility to protect patient’s privacy and a business 
motivation to properly secure their assets. These providers encounter barriers to achieving 
these objectives and limited academic research has been conducted to examine the causes and 
strategies to overcome them. A subset of this demographic, businesses with less than 10 
providers, compose a majority 57% of provider organizations in the United States. This 
grounded theory study provides exploratory findings, discovering these small healthcare 
provider organizations (SHPO) have limited knowledge on information technology (IT) and 
information security that results in assumptions and misappropriations of information security 
implementation, who is responsible for security, and what the scope of security is to address 
organizational cyber risk. A theory conveying the interrelationship among concepts, 
illustrating these barriers, is visually communicated. This research can be leveraged by 
researchers to further understand the dimensions of the identified barriers and by practitioners 
to develop strategies to improve organizational information security for this demographic. 
The study’s findings may apply to SHPOs in other states as the criteria of South Carolina 
based SHPOs did not seem to influence the findings. 
Intensive interviewing was conducted on nine SHPOs in the state of South Carolina to 
elicit their thoughts and perspectives on information security at their business, how decisions 
are made regarding information security, how threats and risks to their business are perceived, 
and to understand financial activities associated with providing information security at their 
organization.  
The concepts and categories, and how they interrelate to each other compose the 
“flashlight in a dark room” theory. This theory claims the current IT and information security 
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knowledge of staff responsible for information security at these SHPOs produces a narrow 
scope of what is required for proper information security and informs their perceived cyber 
risk exposure. These personnel are only “seeing” what the flashlight illuminates in a dark 
room full of cyber risk. They are committed to secure their organization appropriately and are 
confident in their current cyber security posture. This causes an organizational cyber risk 
reality versus perception misalignment, resulting in unknown, accepted risk exposure. 
SHPOs support information security and are motivated to be ‘as secure as possible’ 
with a strong emphasis on protecting their patient’s protected health information. This 
suggests if ‘the “overhead light in the dark room” could be turned on, and illuminate the scope 
of cyber risk, these organizations would begin to work toward implementing security controls 
that align to their actual cyber risk.  
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Healthcare providers have a responsibility to protect patient’s privacy and a business 
motivation to properly secure their assets (Bianchi, 2009; M. Smith, 2017). Despite motivation 
and regulation, these organization types struggle with adequate information security (Institute, 
2016). Currently, it is not understood what issues and impediments are causing this state of 
inadequacy and limited academic research has been done in this specific area (Appari & 
Johnson, 2010).  
Small healthcare provider organizations (SHPO), healthcare providers with 10 or fewer 
practicing physicians, are a subset of healthcare providers. These entities are subject to the same 
regulations and threats as large healthcare provider organizations, but with less human resources, 
data assets and resources associated with information and system privacy and security. 
The following dissertation research project studies South Carolina-based SHPO 
information security decision processes from participants involved in these experiences to 
understand factors that are defining and driving the state of information security at SHPOs. The 
output of this effort was a theory, grounded in data, explaining the phenomena of why SHPOs 
struggle with effective information security programs. 
Background 
Information technology and Internet-access are ubiquitous in the healthcare industry 
today, especially with the incentives and motivations of governmental programs encouraging IT 
adoption (Jones, Rudin, Perry, & Shekelle, 2014). Threat-actors including insider threats, nation-
states, cyber-criminals and competitors can disclose, destroy, modify or make unavailable IT-
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vital assets causing harm to healthcare businesses (Coats, 2017). Information security controls 
are the mechanisms organizations can use to mitigate the risk of these threats (NIST, 2004).  
Information security controls are designed to meet one or more of the three fundamental 
security objectives (Ross, 2013). These objectives are confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Confidentiality ensures only individuals that are authorized to access a resource are allowed. 
Availability ensures authorized individuals can access a resource when they want. Integrity 
ensures the resources composition is not modified or destroyed in an unauthorized manner. 
These control objectives are required for healthcare provider organizations through physical, 
administrative and technical controls as defined by the Healthcare Information Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA).  
The United States healthcare industry creates, uses, manages and protects sensitive 
information. This industry’s data includes protected health information (PHI). The nature of what 
an individual discusses with a healthcare provider is personal. Furthermore, privacy of that 
information is expected and federally regulated. The information includes sensitive information 
such as an individual's medical history, drug use, sexual history, mental health history and 
diagnoses (Gostin, Lazzarini, Neslund, & Osterholm, 1996). This list is not exhaustive but 
demonstrates the criticality of properly securing the data from unauthorized disclosure while 
emphasizing the importance of timely access by authorized individuals.   
South Carolina healthcare organizations’ intent to secure systems and protect patient 
information is not just a best practice for appropriate business responsibility, but all U.S. 
healthcare organizations are regulated by HIPAA. HIPAA includes explicit sections that 
document required security and privacy controls. This federal regulation, enforced by the U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), mandates business entities that handle PHI are 
subject to and must comply with HIPAA.  
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Presidential policy directive 21 (PPD-21) establishes the policy for “the United States to 
strengthen the security and resilience of its critical infrastructure against both physical and cyber 
threats” (House, 2013). HHS is designated as the sector specific agency for Healthcare sector 
(DHS, 2017b). HHS is empowered to develop a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
healthcare sector-specific plan. Healthcare is identified in as a sector of the U.S’s critical 
infrastructure (DHS, 2017a). Direct patient care, encompassing SHPO, is defined in the sector-
specific plan as a private sub-sector within the healthcare sector. The healthcare sector-specific 
plan defines goals focused on security and resilience of healthcare systems and services. 
South Carolina SHPOs must comply with state regulations in addition to HIPAA federal 
regulation. South Carolina state regulations, defined in the Certified Industrial Hygiene and 
Certified Safety Profession Title Protection Act ("SC Code of Laws - Title 39 - Chapter 1 - 
General Provisions," 2018), require breach notification. Specifically the law states “a person 
conducting business in this State, and owning or licensing computerized data or other data that 
includes personal identifying information, shall disclose a breach of the security of the system 
following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to a resident of this 
State whose personal identifying information that was not rendered unusable through encryption, 
redaction, or other methods was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an 
unauthorized person when the illegal use of the information has occurred or is reasonably likely 
to occur or use of the information creates a material risk of harm to the resident”.  
HIPAA requires controls that address security and privacy of information assets. The 
Certified Industrial Hygiene and Certified Safety Profession Title Protection Act (2018) requires 
response actions in the event of a privacy breach. The guidance for protecting critical 
infrastructure focuses on security and resilience of systems. All are important to consider when 
making information security decisions for a South Carolina-based SHPO. 
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Healthcare organizations utilize technology and operational processes to reduce cyber-
risk, the risk of an adverse incident resulting in the compromise of one or more security 
objectives for a controlled resource (i.e. breach of a patient data, unavailability of a medical 
device), and address HIPAA requirements. Information security technology can include 
firewalls, intrusion detection systems and endpoint security applications. Operational processes 
can include recurring user account validity reviews, operating system patching and configuration 
management. 
Small businesses have a high-likelihood of being targeted in a cyber security related 
attack. According to Ponemon (Institute, 2017), 54% of small businesses have suffered a data 
breach and 61% have suffered a cyber-attack within twelve months of the report. Furthermore, 
research conducted in 2016 showed healthcare organizations experience 11.4 cyber-attacks per 
year on average, about one every month (Institute, 2016). Victims can experience multiple 
impacts from a compromise including financial loss, reputational damage and operational 
degradation.  
Kane (Kane, 2017) reported through the American Medical Association, in the 2017 
annual Policy Research Perspectives, 57.8% of physicians work in practices with 10 or fewer 
physicians. Given a majority of healthcare providers are 10 physicians or fewer, this value is 
used as a defining factor to qualify the “small” attribute of a SHPO. SHPO is a large population 
of healthcare businesses that have a unique intersection of sensitive data, regulations to ensure 
security and privacy, a desirable target for cyber-criminals and resource constraints to properly 
secure it.  
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Problem Statement 
Given these challenges and demands small healthcare organizations are subject to, 
implementing effective information security controls poses a challenge. 67% of healthcare 
organizations self-identify as not having a very effective cybersecurity posture, based on 
Ponemon’s (Institute, 2016) research of 535 organizations, where 96% of respondents were from 
organizations less than 500 employees. 
These organization types should be securing their data assets, yet the majority are not. 
There are multiple possibilities that could be the root cause of this state. For example, small 
healthcare organizations may not understand how to implement effective security controls, there 
may be a lack of resources to allow the implementation of effective security controls or there 
may be an intentional decision not to implement effective security controls. The lack of 
academic research in the underlying motivations of small healthcare providers information 
security program management decision processing leaves a gap in the literature exploring 
management’s decision and support impact on overall information security control effectiveness. 
The problem addressed by this study is why information security at SHPOs is not very 
effective despite external and internal factors that promote the opposite. Focused factors are 
associated with the environment and applicable circumstances that shape the culture, decisions 
and approach of SHPO’s information security. 
Purpose 
The research explored South Carolina, small (less than 10 physician practices) healthcare 
providers' management perceptions of vulnerability to cyber-attacks and the motivations 
influencing their security control implementation decisions they take to safeguard their 
organizations. 
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The research utilized a Grounded theory research methodology with an interpretivist 
worldview. Grounded theory is a methodology pioneered by Glaser and Strauss in the late 
1960’s that moved qualitative inquiry from a descriptive study into an explanatory theoretical 
framework, allowing for a deeper understanding of the studied phenomena (Charmaz, 2014; B. 
G. a. S. Glaser, A.L., 1967). 
Grounded theory from a interpretivist worldview enables researchers to inductively 
develop a theory or pattern of meaning rather that start with a theory, as in a post positivist 
worldview (Creswell, 2014). A theory explaining the process that management at small 
healthcare businesses engage to implement, maintain and justify their information security 
decisions was contributed to the body of knowledge.   
Significance 
There is limited literature on information security practices in small businesses despite 
the significant footprint they compose within the U.S. economic landscape , specifically 99.7% 
of U.S. businesses with paid employees (Advocacy, 2017). SHPOs make up the majority of 
healthcare provider organizations in the United States, representing 57.8% of all healthcare 
providers (Kane, 2017). Furthermore anecdotal evidence shows a majority of information 
security professionals at organizations within the healthcare sector assess the current state of 
cybersecurity in healthcare as failing or barely passing (HealthcareInfoSecurity.com, 2017).  
The exploratory findings from the research can be used by SHPOs to understand how to 
improve the organization’s information security posture and how the organization compares to 
other comparable population, geography and demographic healthcare organizations. This 
research can inform policy makers at multiple levels (i.e. organizational, local, state, federal) on 
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decisions that impact regulation and best practices. It can also be used to inform information 
security decisions by leadership at SHPOs. 
Grounded theory as an exploratory research methodology is appropriate to understand the 
current state of practice, the attitude and culture of these organizations and explains what is 
actually happening (McCallin, 2003). An exploratory research approach was appropriate in this 
context given this lack of understanding of this topic (Creswell, 2013, 2014). The research 
design leveraged the qualitative method of grounded theory to inductively develop a theoretical 
understanding of what is happening from an operational perspective within these organizations; 
generated from raw data gathered during interviews, memos and other essential methods 
required for grounded theory (A. Bryant & Charmaz, 2007).  
Nature of Study 
Business processes determining information security decisions are specific to individual 
organizations and are conducted through social processes (K. G. Smith et al., 1994). 
Management makes information security decisions for the organization based on the information 
available to address risk and regulations. Qualitative research provides for understanding of 
social phenomena, such as this decision process.  
A qualitative research design was appropriate for this research area given the limited 
research in the area of small healthcare provider business information security, the increased 
potential impact of security control failure in the healthcare industry and the subjective factors 
that drive decision makers at small healthcare provider organizations. 
Grounded theory specifically aligns with this area of research. It supports exploratory 
research, relies heavily on the experiences and interpretations of the participants in the setting. 
Unique to grounded theory, it allows the researcher to dynamically drive the direction of the 
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study as areas of interest present themselves through concurrent data generation and analysis. 
This research freedom complements the inductive approach to data analysis. Additionally, 
grounded theory supports deductive data analysis, enabling researchers to retrospectively apply 
findings, such as a theory, inductively developed on previously executed interviews or memos to 
affirm the findings or provide input into tuning it. 
Detail on this study’s research design are captured in the following table, attributes are 
based on Creswell’s (Creswell, 2014)  model for qualitative constructivist proposal format and 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009) “Research Onion” diagram. 
A brief value determined for each research design attribute is provided. A complete explanation 
for each attribute is in Chapter 3. 
Table 1 - Research design properties 
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Attribute Value 
Philosophical worldview Interpretivism / Constructivist 
Qualitative design strategy Grounded theory 
Researcher role Active participant and observer 
Approach Inductive 
Choice Monomethod 
Time horizon Cross-sectional 
Data collection Interview 
Data analysis 
Concurrent data gathering and analysis; 
Thematic coding and abstraction; Grounded 
theory systematic analysis methods 
Research support software Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis 
Internal validity Data triangulation 
 
Research participants were recruited through canvassing techniques. Additionally, the 
principal investigator (PI) engaged with a South Carolina medical association to leverage the 
association’s communication channels to promote the study and solicit participants. 
Bounding the Study 
The following describes the environment that the research was conducted, the types of 
participants that were solicited for data inputs and the aspects of the participants experiences that 
were under discussion. The sensitivity of the research topic included adherence to federal 
regulations, protection of patient information, financial losses and negligence. Each is a sensitive 
topic and may dissuade a participant from being forthcoming with complete, honest responses 
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(Saunders et al., 2009). Ethical considerations for this type of collected data and the approach to 
promoting complete responses are also detailed below and in the data collection subsection. 
Setting. The study investigated SHPO and the processes management exercises to make 
information security decisions. Interviews were the primary method for data generation. 
Saunders (Saunders et al., 2009) provides guidance on conducting interviews to encourage 
participation, limit interviewer bias, and promote full responses. Interviews occurred via a 
teleconference medium, in accordance with approved Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
requirements.  
Interviews were overtly audio recorded. Recording could have been omitted from an 
interview per research participant request in accordance with the research participant consent. No 
participant exercised this option. 
Participants. Target research participants were individuals that work within management 
or leadership roles in small healthcare provider practices within South Carolina that are 
accountable for information security at the SHPO. If a SHPO has more than one individual 
accountable for information security, all accountable individuals were interviewed 
simultaneously to avoid gaps in responses or conflicting responses from separate interviews. 
The constructivist approach to grounded theory places the researcher as a subjective 
active participant in data generation with the participant (Birks & Mills, 2015). The raw data 
from the participants ground any developed abstraction or theory, but it is the researcher’s 
interpretation that constructs these abstractions and theories. Focus remained on understanding 
the meaning participants hold about the problem. 
Events. This grounded theory study sought to understand processes engaged and 
influences into these processes for information security management at SHPO, specifically 
explicit activities involved in affecting the security posture of an organization.  
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Events in-scope were strategic level decisions that relate to the identification, protection, 
detection, response and recovery of business assets, including but not limited to patient health 
information, business support systems (e.g. payroll) and biomedical devices. 
Processes. Processes in-scope are strategic level activities and management activities 
related to understanding what knowledge and inputs factors on informing management on 
strategic information security decisions are. Additionally, the operational execution of this 
strategic vision and the company culture associated with information security was investigated.  
Ethical Considerations 
Internal or sensitive information may have been disclosed during the research activity 
that could have caused harm to the research participant personally or to the organization the 
research participant represents. 
Multiple techniques were employed to address these ethical considerations, convey trust 
and promote full, honest responses. IRB approval was sought prior to collecting any data. All 
research participants were required to listen and acknowledge an informed consent declaration 
that clearly communicates their rights and expectations to privacy as a participant in the study. 
Participants and their organization were de-identified.  A mapping tool identifying participants 
and organizations with their unique study identifier was maintained with strict access controls 
and data at rest encryption. All data was protected in accordance with approved IRB 
requirements.  
The researcher would have entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with research 
participants if the research participant organization required it. This assumes the NDA does not 
prevent any aspect of the data analysis or findings disclosure described in chapter 3. This was not 
exercised by any participants. 
EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY 
 12 
The researcher utilized a defer technique when a research participant inquired to the 
interviewer about the interviewer’s views on a topic. For example, if a research participant 
asked, “what should I know about the HIPAA security rule”. The researcher would reply “I do 
not want to influence your responses. I’ll be happy to discuss upon the conclusion of this 
research study”, to avoid researcher bias or influence on participant responses.  
Definitions 
Certain terms are used throughout this document that can have different meanings based 
on background, experience and perspective. Definitions for key terms are provided in Appendix 
A. The purpose of defining these key terms is to establish a common language within the scope 
of this research and its findings. 
Assumptions 
The researcher was an active participant in this research study. Additionally, the 
researcher was coding, abstracting and developing the grounded theory. The researcher’s 
assumptions are therefore critical to identify both for the researcher and consumers of the study’s 
findings. 
Enumeration of these assumptions limit the researcher bias influence on the findings (Birks 
& Mills, 2015, p. 20). Researcher’s assumptions were:  
● Any previous healthcare experience by the researcher did not influence research 
participants. 
● In-scope SHPOs’ participants are for-profit entities. 
● Healthcare provider organizations are making assumptions that IT staff are also handling 
information security. 
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● Healthcare provider organizations with inadequate information security controls would 
not want to know about it. 
Scope, Limitations, Delimitations 
The scope of this research is detailed in “bounding the study” section of Chapter 1. 
Grounded theory was used as an exploratory research method. This research applied to SHPO in 
the state of South Carolina. This research is assumed to be generalizable to other US 
geographies, but not to other healthcare entities that are non-providers such as clearinghouse and 
insurers. This research is assumed to be not transferable to these non-provider types because of 
the distinction that healthcare providers uniquely work with biomedical devices, have ownership 
of permanent medical records and provide treatment to individuals. 
Grounded theory is a qualitative research method that uses inductive reasoning to develop 
a theory from observed data. This approach to research does not start with a hypothesis to test 
through deductive reasoning, but instead creates a theory that then can be used later in deductive 
reasoning-based research. This is an appropriate research method choice for this study given the 
limited research that has been conducted in this area.  
Orthodox practice of traditional grounded theory requires no literature review prior to 
engaging in data generation and collection (B. G. a. S. Glaser, A.L., 1967) . The idea behind this 
approach is to reduce researcher bias into subconsciously fitting the data to fit existing literature 
instead of having the theory developed exclusively based on collected data. A literature review 
was conducted given this study was in support of a dissertation research project and a literature 
review was a required component of this project. Every effort to limit researcher bias was 
utilized to avoid this issue introduced by the literature review.  
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Chapter Summary 
There are regulatory, ethical and pragmatic business reasons for small healthcare 
providers organizations to implement information security controls at their business, yet surveys 
and incidents have demonstrated this market is insufficiently addressing protecting its assets 
from realized threats, detecting when incidents have occurred and effectively recovering from 
these incidents without suffering significant impact. 
Grounded theory is a research methodology that develops a theory based heavily on data 
collected from individuals experiencing the phenomena being studied, in this case individuals 
responsible for information security at small healthcare providers. Grounded theory provides a 
method to conduct exploratory research, an approach that aligns with the lack of research being 
performed in this area. 
A literature review provides an understanding of what research has been done in this area 
to date and what factors shape the reality of the setting. The following chapter provides insight 
into the developments of small business information security and discuss the nuances a 
healthcare setting overlays on these types of businesses.   




Healthcare cybersecurity is a key public health concern that needs immediate and 
aggressive attention. 
- (FORCE, 2017) 
Information security within the healthcare industry is a complicated area of interest. 
There are several factors to consider including securing the systems that enable direct patient 
care (i.e. Electronic Health Records (EHR)), ancillary patient care (i.e. lab, x-rays), and business 
management (i.e. scheduling, billing). The data within these systems must also be secured from a 
security risk (e.g. integrity of a patient’s drug allergies) and a privacy risk (e.g. a patient's HIV 
status). Regulation, threats, risks, vulnerabilities and impact must be considered for these 
systems and data when approaching information security program management. 
Healthcare information systems (HIS), such as the EHR, are comprehensive repositories 
of patient care history, used not only by healthcare providers but also patients, family members, 
payers and others engaged in the business of healthcare, researchers, and government agencies. 
Unfortunately, this utility and data-rich environment attracts criminals (Luna, Rhine, Myhra, 
Sullivan, & Kruse, 2016). 
Healthcare information systems and technology are complex. They are integrated, 
provide patient care and contain individual’s personal health information. The security and 
resilience of these systems is important to individuals whose information is stored in the systems 
and to the healthcare professionals that rely on the information as a communication tool to 
provide care to patients. The healthcare provider is concerned with the security and resilience of 
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these systems to comply with regulations and to provide quality patient care to patients. The 
confidentiality, availability and integrity of healthcare systems is therefore critical. 
Small businesses within this sector have the same challenges and requirements as larger 
businesses with less access to financial and information security expertise resources. 
The following literature review provides a review of regulations affecting the healthcare 
industry, the cyber threats, risks and controls healthcare providers must evaluate when making 
information security program decisions and the nuances of a small business.   
Healthcare Information Security 
Whitman and Mattord (Whitman & Mattord, 2011) define information security as “the 
protection of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets, whether in storage, 
processing or transmission; achieved via the application of policy, education, training and 
awareness, and technology”. 
Systems and environments have security requirements defined by the organization that 
address the information security objectives. These requirements are implemented through 
security controls. 
Rohn et al. (Rohn et al., 2016) defines a control as a measure intended to reduce risk to a 
level acceptable by management. IT internal controls at a governance level involve ensuring that 
effective IT management and security principles, policies and processes with appropriate 
compliance measurement tools to assess and measure those controls are in place and operate 
effectively (Rohn et al., 2016). 
Controls have different associated costs and effectiveness for reducing risk, and 
categorically, controls can be physical, technical or administrative in nature (Herold & Beaver, 
2004).  Risk management allows for organizations to analyze and decide what controls to 
implement that reduces risk to acceptable levels (Peltier, 2005). The analysis and selection 
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depend on business need and security requirements according to Barnard and von Solms 
(Barnard & Von Solms, 2000). The factors that influence security control selection were 
expanded by Otero, Otero and Qureshi (Otero, Otero, & Qureshi, 2010) to include cost of 
implementation, scheduling and resource availability. Furthermore, security control selection 
must consider the integration into operational processes as research has shown legitimate users 
will circumvent security for usability and benefit gains (Albrechtsen, 2007) 
The Joint Task Force Transformation Initiative (Initiative, 2011) defined information 
security risk as “the risk associated with the operation and use of information systems that 
support the missions and business functions of their organizations”. Information security risk is 
based on the likelihood and impact of a threat being realized (NIST, 2012).  The NIST Special 
Publication 800-30 revision 1 categorizes threats as one of the following: 
● Hostile cyber or physical attacks, 
● Human errors of omission or commission, 
● Structural failures of organization-controlled resources (e.g., hardware, software, 
environmental controls), and 
● Natural and man-made disasters, accidents, and failures beyond the control of the 
organization 
There are multiple supported information security related threat taxonomies in the 
literature, some focused on the healthcare industry (Kotz, 2011; Landry, Pardue, Johnsten, 
Campbell, & Patidar, 2011; NIST, 2012). Security controls mitigate the event of a risk being 
realized, that is a threat exploiting a weakness resulting in a negatively impacting event. 
Mandiant (Mandiant, 2016) reported the three most significant realized risk trends were 
business disruption attacks, massive data breaches of personally identifiable information (PII), 
and an increased in compromised networking devices. 
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These trends continue to plague the healthcare industry today. Business disruption attacks 
include ransomware, malicious software that encrypts system files and requires the system owner 
to pay a fee to a criminal to obtain the decryption key. Ransomware has significantly impacted 
the healthcare industry and is rampant in its application, accounting for over 70% of all 
malicious software attacks on healthcare providers from 2015-2017 (Verizon, 2018). The 
availability to systems and data is important for healthcare providers to provide patient care. This 
necessity is being exploited by cyber criminals through ransomware. Ransomware attacks on 
healthcare entities has increased significantly since 2016 with several notable attacks including 
MedStar and Hollywood Presbyterian (Davis, 2017; Hegwer, 2017; Kruse, Frederick, Jacobson, 
& Monticone, 2017; Millman, 2016). 
Massive data breaches of PHI are regular occurrences in healthcare with over 1292 
reported in 2015-2017 (Verizon, 2018). Luna et al. (Luna et al., 2016) supported this PHI/PII 
data breach threat trend with research showing data theft is the greatest threat to healthcare with 
the intended purpose being to commit identity theft. 
Kruse et al. (Kruse et al., 2017) conducted a systematic literature review across three 
major medical research databases to understand current trends and threats to organizations within 
the healthcare industry. The research affirmed the healthcare industry struggles with new 
technology, especially with U.S. federal policy promoting an increasing use of technology by 
healthcare provider organizations, and security in response to evolving cyber threats. The 
research also stated the healthcare industry lags other industries in securing data, however the 
databases queried were healthcare-specific databases and the thirty-one papers included in the 
review did not include any papers explicitly evaluating the healthcare sector against other 
sectors. 
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Luna et.al (Luna et al., 2016) conducted a literature review on cybercrime themes and 
trends in healthcare across four research databases, resulting in nineteen papers being selected 
for inclusion. Two broad cybercrime areas, that were identified, are unauthorized access by 
internal parties possible because of known vulnerabilities in the system and external parties 
disclosing data beyond its intended scope of use. 
Researchers “Independent Security Evaluators” (Evaluators, 2016) conducted a 24-month 
security assessment of 12 healthcare facilities and found that remote adversaries have a high 
likelihood of successfully exploiting healthcare systems showcasing the vulnerability and 
immaturity of healthcare organizations with respect to cyber security. Systemic causes of these 
weaknesses were identified as lack of executive support, insufficient talent, improper 
implementations of technology, outdated understanding of adversaries, lack of leadership, and a 
misguided reliance upon compliance (Evaluators, 2016). 
“Independent Security Evaluators” (Evaluators, 2016) research highlighted the state of 
information security by finding even fundamentals are not being properly implemented including 
the development and adherence to policy and procedures, the lack of audit capability to assess 
the presence or effectiveness of security controls and the practice of deploying technologies 
insecurely and misaligned to enterprise architecture (Evaluators, 2016). 
An independent research organization, The Ponemon Institute (Institute, 2016), 
conducted a survey in 2015 to gauge the state of cybersecurity in healthcare. The survey of 535 
IT and IT security healthcare professionals. High level findings found that healthcare 
organizations experience on average almost one cyber-attack per month. 
Eighty-eight percent of respondents worked for an organization with 100-500 employees. 
This organization size is more aligned to a medium-sized business per various definitions of 
business sizes. Therefore, this research while not excluding large and small-sized healthcare 
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organizations, is heavily skewed toward medium-sized entities (Institute, 2016). Of note, the 
most common security incident noted in the Ponemon study (2016) was exploitation of existing 
software vulnerabilities. This infers organizations were not patching their systems and software 
(Institute, 2016). Finally, sixty-seven percent of respondents stated their cybersecurity posture 
was not effective because of a lack of coordination with other business functions (76%), lack of 
resources (73%) and cybersecurity not being a priority (65%) (Institute, 2016). 
Fernando and Dawson’s (Fernando & Dawson, 2009) research found conflict between 
healthcare providers and privacy and security controls. The research, based on a structured 
interview with twenty-six clinician respondents on healthcare information system privacy and 
security experiences, found efforts by clinicians to avoid conflict and emphasize patient care 
above privacy and security tended to result as security breaches. Also, privacy and security 
specific fiscal and regulatory factors conflicted with improved patient care outcomes. 
Verizon’s PHI Data Breach Report (Verizon, 2018) found of 1360 incidents, where data 
was either confirmed as disclosed or was at risk, 57.5% were caused by internal actors, as 
opposed to the commonly seen external actors. The report highlighted financial incentives and 
curiosity as the primary factors motivating insiders to abuse their access (Verizon, 2018). This is 
pertinent in the healthcare industry as several different medical related frauds may be perpetrated 
with a patient's medical record, and the curiosity to look at a family member or celebrity’s 
medical record. Schoew’s (Schoew, 2018) anecdotal research showed 18% of healthcare 
professionals would sell their healthcare credentials for $500-$1000.  
Hoffman (Hoffman, 2015) claims the healthcare industry has been significantly impacted 
by poor information security controls identifying 90% of healthcare providers experienced a data 
breach within the period of 2012-2014. Healthcare is expected to continue to be a targeted 
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industry given the value of healthcare data in illegal marketplaces and the continued increase 
year over year of cyber-attacks on healthcare entities (Hegwer, 2017; Kruse et al., 2017). 
Poor information security controls and desirable data assets make healthcare an attractive 
target to cyber criminals. Symantec’s survey (Symantec, 2017) reflected this increasing threat. In 
2017, Healthcare saw an increase in malicious email containing malware from 1 in 396 emails to 
1 in 204. This Symantec’s survey (2017) data showed a 4.2% decline in PHI lost in breaches in 
2016, although these statistics appear to be skewed by a major PII and financial breach related to 
the Friend Finder Network that experienced a breach of 412 million user accounts in 2016. The 
same report (Symantec, 2017) showed health services was the second highest percentage, 11.2%, 
of sectors experiencing breach incidents. 
The anticipated sustainment in healthcare targeted attacks are supported by the 
proliferation of patient health data. Patient health data can be used by healthcare providers in 
multiple ways and duplicating electronic data is trivial. Additionally, medical systems are 
expensive to procure leading healthcare providers motivated to realize the maximum amount of 
value from the system regardless if underlying technologies go unsupported by vendors due to 
technology end-of-life (Hoffman, 2015). 
The American Hospital Association (Association, 2016) highlighted the significance of 
proper cybersecurity in healthcare and the need for senior leadership to be thinking about it. 
They produced literature for their constituency that promotes the activity of healthcare 
organizations considering information security fundamentals such as cybersecurity planning, 
accountability and cyber insurance. 
The Health Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS), a global, cause-
based, not-for-profit organization focused on better health through information technology, 
conducts an annual information security executive survey to gauge healthcare organizations 
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current concerns, issues, and direction. The 2015 survey was completed by 297 professionals 
with information security responsibility at a healthcare organization (HIMSS, 2015). Eighty-
seven percent of represented organizations identified information security as a higher business 
priority. This is supported with the metric that over half of these organizations have a Chief 
Information Security Officer (CISO) or other full-time employee with managing information 
security as a full-time responsibility (HIMSS, 2015). Meanwhile, the HIMSS survey results 
reinforced a common issue currently plaguing healthcare organizations. A lack of staffing and 
financial resources were key barriers to properly addressing information security. This translates 
to a lack of knowledge to implement or execute proper information security, and a lack of 
financial support via a lack of support from senior management, either from a miscommunicated 
narrative of actual organizational information security risk or a "tone-deaf ear” by management 
to accepted organizational risk (HIMSS, 2015). 
Finally, research designed to understand the criticality of specific threats to healthcare 
information security, determined power loss was the most critical (Samy, Ahmad, & Ismail, 
2009). Structured interviews were conducted on sixteen staff members across three different 
departments and with a variety of roles at a single healthcare provider in Malaysia. 
Unfortunately, the generalizability of the research is suspect based on the fact all 
participants worked for the same healthcare provider. For example, it is possible that healthcare 
provider had experienced multiple power losses resulting in a skewed perspective of this threat to 
interviewees. 
Governmental Factors 
There are regulations healthcare providers must consider when making information 
security decisions and providing healthcare related service. Government incentives have resulted 
in the acceleration of healthcare providers adopting technologies and solutions that support their 
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business function of providing healthcare, and additionally increases the risk healthcare 
providers are assuming by digitally storing sensitive data through increased access opportunity, 
an inability to detect unauthorized access and the ease with which many patient records can be 
compromised. 
United States based healthcare providers are legally required to provide minimum 
security and privacy controls in their business practices. The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) enacted into law in 1996 and updated in 2000 and 2003 to include 
the Privacy Rule and Security Rule, respectively, makes it mandatory for providers to implement 
policies and procedures focused on protecting patient health information ("HIPAA History," 
2017). 
Relative to information security requirements, HIPAA contains the security rule, the 
privacy rule and a breach notification rule. The security rule establishes national standards to 
protect individuals’ electronic personal health information that is created, received, used, or 
maintained by a covered entity through appropriate administrative, physical and technical 
safeguards ensuring confidentiality, integrity and availability of the electronic PHI (HHS.gov, 
2017b). The privacy rule establishes a set of national standards for the protection of certain 
health information including an individual’s past, present or future physical or mental health, the 
past, present, or future payment associated with provision of healthcare, or the actual provision 
of healthcare through controls around the access, disclosure and retention of that data 
(Assistance, 2003). The breach notification rule requires HIPAA covered entities and their 
business associates to provide notification to affected individuals following a breach of 
unsecured PHI (HHS.gov, 2013). These requirements introduce additional cost, man-power, 
expertise and time to properly implement, operate and continuously monitor. The Enforcement 
Rule was added to HIPAA in 2006 and authorized the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to issue 
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financial penalties for entity that fails to implement HIPAA privacy and security rule ("HIPAA 
History," 2017). 
HIPAA requires security and privacy but does not offer any direction on how to 
systematically implement an information security program strategically or tactically. This has 
caused many healthcare organizations to make a “best effort” at securing systems and properly 
ensuring patient data privacy. “Best effort” is a product of resources, time and expertise a 
healthcare organization can commit to such an endeavor. 
HIPAA federally requires healthcare providers to secure their data and systems. HIPAA 
was criticized for the lack of federal regulation compliance enforcement (Collins, 2007). 
Following criticism, the first penalty for HIPAA non-compliance occurred in 2008, 12 years 
after the law was put into effect. 
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) 
was passed in 2009 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. 
HITECH had many impacts on the healthcare industry from a regulation perspective. It 
incentivized healthcare providers to improve IT infrastructure and encouraged the “meaningful 
use” of EHR systems. HITECH introduced the Enforcement Interim Rule that outlined a tiered 
structure to HIPAA violation financial penalties and increased the overall financial penalties 
themselves. 
In 2010, in support of the HITECH EHR “meaningful use” regulation, the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) implemented a program providing financial incentive 
payouts to healthcare providers that meet criteria for efficient and patient-centered use of EHR 
solutions. Meaningful use was positioned to support timeliness of service and accessibility of 
patient records to authorized individuals ("HIPAA History," 2017). Demonstrating Stage 1, the 
initial stage, of meaningful use is based on fifteen core objectives plus five additional “menu” 
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objectives. One of the fifteen is to “Protect electronic health information” and is measured by 
performing a security risk analysis annually and remediating or mitigating weaknesses 
discovered during risk analysis (HealthIT.gov, 2012). 
The “meaningful use” initiative in HITECH Act has promoted and caused an increase in 
the use of electronic medical records, information technology within the healthcare setting and 
network reliance (Kruse et al., 2017). This incentive was so appealing that adoption rates of 
EHRs went from 12.2% in 2009 to 83.8% in 2015 (HealthIt.gov, 2018). This increase in 
technology expanded the attack surface that healthcare entities must protect and defend while 
increasing the volume of electronic medical data in existence. Maintaining meaningful use for 
quality improvement requires ongoing support for leadership and change management (Green et 
al., 2015). 
The HIPAA Omnibus Final Rule was issued in 2013 and expanded the scope of HIPAA. 
It incorporates improved data security, ePHI access, the requirement of Business Associate 
Agreements (BAA), and breach notification requirements for both covered entities and business 
associates. 
The 21st Century Cures Act was passed into law in late 2016. This law’s purpose is “to 
accelerate the discovery, development, and delivery of 21st century cures, and 
for other purposes”. This law allows qualified, independent third-parties to be certification 
authorities for healthcare related software and systems. Specifically, the Act states third-parties 
certifiers are prioritized based on expertise in multiple areas, including security. It is worth 
noting this does not require a third-party vendor to have expertise in security though, as a 
situation may occur where a third-party certifier lacking expertise is the only one to compete and 
thus be the best option. 
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 The Act bolsters information sharing while explicitly calling out the need to ensure 
security, calling for the assembly of a working group within one year of the Act passing to report 
on the allowance of use and disclosure of PHI for research purposes. The working group must 
have consideration for privacy rights implication and models for secure access of the data assets.  
Organizations that suffer a breach of an individual’s PHI are required to notify the 
individual within 60 days (HHS.gov, 2013). HHS OCR, the HIPAA enforcement office, utilizes 
general deterrence theory to promote information security practices with covered entities and 
business associates, such as healthcare providers. If a data breach impacts more than 500 unique 
individuals, the organization is publicly shamed on the HHS OCR breach portal website 
(HHS.gov, 2018a). HHS OCR enforcement has become highly visible, investigating large 
privacy and security breach cases and levying noteworthy financial penalties, including 
Advocate Healthcare for $5.5M and New York Presbyterian for $4.8M. It is interesting to note 
these material financial penalties may curb behavior, but in 2016 and 2015 only 0.0537% and 
0.0339%, respectively, of HHS OCR PHI breach cases resulted in any financial impact to the 
investigated organization (HHS.gov, 2018b). 
Presidential Policy Directive 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
Healthcare and Public Health directed the federal government to secure and make resilient 
organizations that are deemed critical infrastructure (House, 2013). This was set in policy 
through Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. This 
knowingly applies to both public and private sector organizations that align to critical 
infrastructure, such as financial institutions, power companies and healthcare providers. HHS is 
the sector-specific agency for the healthcare sector. Under this order, information security 
sharing communication channels have been established in the form of the National Health 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (NH-ISAC). Additionally, the National Institute of 
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Standards and Technology (NIST) were empowered to develop a cybersecurity framework that 
could be implemented by critical infrastructure organizations voluntarily (Paul Proctor, 2016). 
Healthcare providers leverage technology to provide patient care in many situations. The 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the federal agency charged with governing biomedical 
devices functionality and security (Administration, 2018). Biomedical devices must receive FDA 
certification before they authorized to be utilized in clinical environments. The FDA 
(Administration, 2016) has released guidance around the secure operation and management of 
biomedical devices in “Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices”. This 
document provides a reference to healthcare providers in the effective execution of medical 
device risk management, and the reporting and remediating of security vulnerabilities. The FDA 
is responsible for the security of biomedical devices, but the direction from the agency is 
presented in the form of guidance and does not have gravity to enforce compliance. This is most 
notably seen in the Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices” where the 
first words of the document are “Contains Nonbinding Recommendations”. 
There is also relevant South Carolina state law that applied to this research. South 
Carolina passed the Financial Identity Fraud and Identity Theft Protection Act in 2013. This law 
requires South Carolina organizations that suffer a data breach involving 1000 or more 
individuals’ personal information to notify the affected individuals and pay up to a $1000 per 
individual fine ("SC Code of Laws - Title 39 - Chapter 1 - General Provisions," 2018). 
Healthcare Technology 
Shekelle, Morton, and Keeler’s (Shekelle, Morton, & Keeler, 2006) systematic review of 
literature on technology in healthcare identified it has many applications and potential to reduce 
healthcare costs, improve the safety and efficiency of patient care and outcome. Goldzweig, 
Towfigh, Maglione, and Shekelle’s (Goldzweig, Towfigh, Maglione, & Shekelle, 2009) updated 
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review of the literature showed these benefits continue to be seen with the addition of a positive 
financial impact for the healthcare provider business. 
Healthcare technology is a diverse field. Dixon, Zafar, and McGowan (Dixon, Zafar, & 
McGowan, 2007) developed a taxonomy for healthcare information technology to support a 
searchable knowledge base that defines the interrelationships among health IT planning, 
implementation and evaluation. This taxonomy presents the potential scope a healthcare provider 
may possess for an information technology footprint to secure. The taxonomy, presented in table 
below, is based on inputs from a panel of medical information experts from across the United 
States (Dixon et al., 2007). 
Table 2 - Healthcare information technology taxonomy (Dixon et al., 2007) 
Major Category Minor Category 
I. Organizational Strategy 
A. Financial 
B. Planning 
C. Process Change 







E. Electronic Health 
F. Telehealth 
G. Health Information Exchange (HIE) 
III. Value A. Research 
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Major Category Minor Category 
B. Evaluation Outcomes 
IV. Laws and Regulations 





A . Professional Societies 
B. Payers 
C. Governmental 








In addition to traditional IT systems, disruptive technology, such as Internet-of-Things 
(IoT) and cloud-based systems are resulting in tectonic shifts in the way technology is integrated 
into businesses that introduces privacy and security concerns (O'Brien, Budish, Faris, Gasser, & 
Lin, 2016). Tarouco et al. (Tarouco et al., 2012) showed IoT devices are increasing in healthcare 
related usage, and may increase security risk. Furthermore, cloud systems are being utilized by 
healthcare businesses to offset cost and management of technology, but at the risk of storing 
sensitive data in other businesses’ systems (Sultan, 2014). 
The HITECH Act spurned a rapid computerization of healthcare providers, manifesting 
in a significantly high rate of implemented EHR systems (HealthIt.gov, 2018). Halamka and 
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Tripathi (Halamka & Tripathi, 2017) provide evidence that a primary end user, the clinicians, 
were negatively impacted by this rapid adoption. EHR vendors, while benefiting greatly from the 
legislative force to procure their products, were also impacted. Deficiencies for users and 
vendors have been identified in five key areas: usability, workflow, innovation, interoperability 
and patient engagement (Halamka & Tripathi, 2017). 
Kruse et al. (Kruse et al., 2017) systematic literature review affirmed the healthcare 
industry struggles with new technology, especially with U.S. federal policy promoting an 
increasing use of technology by healthcare provider organizations, and security in response to 
evolving cyber threats. 
In addition to a user base that demonstrates challenge integrating technology and an 
active role in circumventing security controls the technology may introduce, Green et al. (Green 
et al., 2015) showed the maintenance of the EHR after implementation requires continual expert 
technical support to address upgrades and security needs.  
Management Impact 
NIST Special Publication 800-37 revision 1, when addressing the importance of 
leadership to an organization’s information security posture, states “Given the significant and 
growing danger of these threats, it is imperative that leaders at all levels of an organization 
understand their responsibilities for achieving adequate information security and for managing 
information system-related security risks” (NIST, 2010). 
Peltier (Peltier, 2005) claimed support of risk management by senior management is a 
demonstration of its due diligence. He expanded on this claim by stating the role of senior 
management is to ensure necessary resources are effectively applied to develop the capabilities 
to meet mission requirements (Peltier, 2005). 
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Hoffman (Hoffman, 2015) highlighted the pivotal role senior management plays in 
enterprise adoption of information security controls, specifically taking a more active role in 
supporting and understanding information security elements of the business. 
Barton, Tejay, Lane and Terrell (Barton, Tejay, Lane, & Terrell, 2016) showed the 
importance of the role senior management performs in assuring that information security is 
supported. This research found senior management's ability to shape beliefs and culture of staff, 
and to allocate resources and set priorities had direct impact on achieving effective information 
security in an organization (Barton et al., 2016). Barton et al. (Barton et al., 2016) also found that 
senior management belief in information security leads to greater participation in IT security 
governance by senior management. Francis, Xiaohong, Jinsheng, and Hong (Francis, Xiaohong, 
Jinsheng, & Hong, 2013) similarly showed “tone at the top” through visible and actionable 
support from senior management of an effective training and awareness program promotes 
adoption of new information security-enabled procedures and overall information security 
program success. 
Eilon (Eilon, 1969) defined the decision process as the activity of analyzing information 
material, defining performance measures to determine how a course of action will be judged, 
enumerating and predicting possible outcomes, and selecting a course of action based on choice 
criteria. Healthcare provider’s leadership must make decisions when addressing information 
security risks and regulations. 
Bhattacharya (Bhattacharya, 2011) found transactional leadership styles led to greater 
information security concern by staff at small businesses. A transactional leadership style 
rewards for compliant behavior and punishes for non-compliant behavior (Bass, 2008). 
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Small Business Challenges 
57.8% of healthcare providers in the United States are small businesses and have 10 
physicians or less (Kane, 2017). Healthcare-based businesses are managing the industry specific 
information security challenges discussed above. 
Current research shows that small businesses are vulnerable to cybercrime and 
experiencing an increase in cyberattacks, compounding the challenge’s magnitude (Institute, 
2017). Small businesses are being increasingly targeted by cyber criminals because of their 
limited implemented security controls and the increased proficiency of criminals to automate 
web-based attacks (Chickowski, 2010). 
Rohn et al. (Rohn et al., 2016) investigated information technology security practices of 
small businesses, through document review and semi-structured interviews, and found low levels 
of small businesses management awareness of information security threats increased the 
organizations vulnerability to information security breaches because of an unsupported optimism 
of the small businesses information security posture. Increasing awareness addresses the issue of 
misjudging current security posture but does not assure action to reduce risk. Johnson and Koch 
(Johnson & Koch, 2006) found even when small business owners are concerned and aware of 
cyber threats they are not willing to take action to defend or pay for protection. 
Large healthcare organizations, much like any large business, can have specialized 
resources available that can be dedicated and focused toward an effort such as implementing an 
information security program. Small and medium-sized healthcare organizations, much like 
small and medium-sized businesses, are resource-constrained and do not have the opportunity to 
dedicate resources to programmatic information security to protect their data and assets 
(Bagwell, 2016). Unfortunately, medical practices with limited financial, technical, and 
organizational resources not associated with larger systems typically lack access to the necessary 
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technical expertise, financial resources, and leverage with vendors to meet the needs of 
maintaining an EHR alone (Green et al., 2015).  
Cybercriminals are targeting small businesses. Business email compromise (BEC) 
attacks, an attack where a criminal sends email impersonating a business senior leader to request 
a subordinate to take an action (i.e. transfer money), occurred on average 400 times every day, 
with small- and medium-sized businesses the most targeted (Symantec, 2017). 
Van Ommen’s (Van Ommen, 2014) quantitative research aimed to determine a causal 
link between a small businesses IT security implementation maturity and its security incident 
occurrence. He was unable to determine if there is a relationship between a small business’s IT 
security maturity level and the number of incidents experienced by the business. This research 
was based on survey questionnaire responses and had a population of sixteen responses calling 
into question the validity of the results. Supporting the suspect validity of this research, Van 
Ommen (2014) states “the method of gathering data about the occurrence of IT security related 
incidents used in this study turned out not to be the best way available, but this study lacked the 
resources and time to perform a more thorough case study”. 
Conclusion 
Much of healthcare organizations are small businesses. These organizations are at high 
risk of information security and privacy incidents. These organizations hold valuable data assets 
and are being targeted by cyber criminals for them, but often have limited financial, knowledge 
and technical resources to protect these assets sufficiently. Compounding the problem, federal 
incentive programs have resulted in a massive adoption of technology that was not always based 
on need or interest by the procuring organization, resulting in inadequate security controls; when 
small business users provide patient care with “misfit” technology, the ongoing maintenance of 
that technology may be low priority. 
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Moreover, there are many healthcare related, information security threats that must be 
considered when making risk related decisions. Disruptive technologies like Cloud and Internet 
of Things are expanding attack surfaces and distributing an organization’s PHI storage locations. 
Internal and external threat actors, environmental, and natural threats may negatively impact a 
healthcare organization’s ability to operate if not properly mitigated, avoided or transference. 
Leaders of small healthcare businesses significantly impact the direction and actions 
taken by the organization. The information security attitude and culture promoted by these 
stakeholders shapes the approach the organization has toward secure practices. These leaders 
must account for federal HIPAA regulations, South Carolina law, and the availability needs of its 
systems and data for business operation needs. Unfortunately, they may have a false perception 
of information security threats and their organization’s capability and capacity to address them. 
Low levels of small businesses management awareness of information security threats increase 
the organization’s vulnerability to information security breaches because of an unsupported 
optimism of the small businesses information security posture (Rohn et al., 2016). 




There are multiple methodologies to conduct research (Creswell, 2014). According to 
Bryant (M. T. Bryant, 2003), the research method a researcher chooses should be influenced by 
the nature of the questions being asked. This qualitative research studied the decision processes 
of small healthcare businesses information security program management to understand factors, 
motivations, influences and thought affecting these programs effectiveness. 
This chapter provides greater detail into the research design structure and the 
appropriateness of the design. Grounded theory systematic design for application to this research 
is documented, providing an explanation of the tools that were used to develop a theory 
grounded in data. The data collection and analysis processes, including the interactions and 
expectations from participants is documented. A detailed explanation of how trustworthiness of 
the research is provided including provisions that are incorporated into the design to promote 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability.  
Research Methods and Design Appropriateness 
Qualitative research has seen a significant adoption by the academic community over the 
last 30 years and is considered an accepted method of conducting research, especially 
exploratory research (Huberman & Miles, 2002). This research utilizes a grounded theory 
research methodology with an interpretivist worldview. Grounded theory is a methodology 
pioneered by Glaser and Strauss in the late 1960’s that moved qualitative inquiry from a 
descriptive study into an explanatory theoretical framework, allowing for a deeper understanding 
of the studied phenomena (Charmaz, 2006). 
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A qualitative research design is appropriate for this research area given the limited 
research in the area of small healthcare provider business information security, the inadequate 
security control implementation in the healthcare industry (Holtzman, 2017) and the subjective 
factors that drive decision makers at small healthcare provider organizations. An inductively 
developed theory explaining the process that management at small healthcare businesses engage 
to implement, maintain and justify their information security decisions was contributed to the 
body of knowledge. 
Grounded theory specifically aligns with this area of research. It supports exploratory 
research, relying heavily on the experiences and interpretations of the participants in the setting. 
The researcher investigates areas of interest as they present themselves through concurrent data 
generation and analysis. This research freedom complements the inductive approach to data 
analysis and fits the need of a research area that is lacking significant academic research, such as 
this study (Birks & Mills, 2015).  
Additionally, grounded theory supports deductive data analysis. Researchers can apply 
developing theories retrospectively to previously executed interviews or memos to affirm the 
findings or provide negative case analysis to refine the theory. The researcher believes 
understanding how these organizations are processing and implementing their decisions is 
understood through the analysis of their experiences, and that their reality of the phenomena is 
critical for informing any theory that provides an explanation to that process. 
Grounded theory provides a systematic procedure for inquiry (Creswell, 2014). There are 
essential grounded theory methods, documented in the data collection and data analysis sections 
below, that are considered required to be used for a study to qualify as grounded theory (Birks & 
Mills, 2015). This bolsters the likelihood of quality, consistency and accuracy in adherence to the 
grounded theory research methodology. This does not guarantee grounded theory though as 
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many studies claiming to be grounded theory are actually not for various reasons including non-
inclusion of the above-mentioned required methods. 
A primary method of data collection was intensive interviewing. Grounded theory is 
based on user experiences that can be gathered through interviews. The interviews were 
unstructured initially. A set of open-ended questions will be used to allow for free-flowing 
responses from participants. These questions can be found in Appendix B. The interviews 
transitioned to semi-structured as themes began to develop. Both methods are appropriate for 
exploratory studies that involve questions with complex answers that may vary from respondent 
to respondent (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Interviews were transcribed to support qualitative data analysis processes and to 
strengthen descriptive validity. Participant responses were analyzed for codes, themes and 
categories in accordance with grounded theory processes.  
Additionally, memos were generated throughout the research process. Memos are 
essential to generating a grounded theory and are treated as data as well. According to Lempert 
(Lempert, 2007) memos document the analytical interpretation of collected and analyzed data 
allowing researchers to organize analysis and findings while keeping it grounded in the data. 
Population, Site and Sampling 
Target organizations for this research are healthcare provider organizations within the 
state of South Carolina that have 10 or less physicians on staff. Target research participants are 
individuals that work within management or leadership roles in small healthcare provider 
practices within South Carolina that are accountable for information security at the SHPO. If a 
SHPO has more than one individual accountable for information security, all accountable 
individuals were interviewed in a focus group to avoid gaps in responses or conflicting responses 
from separate interviews. There are no age, gender, or ethnicity criteria for research participants. 
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The population sampling strategy utilized snowball sampling, a strategy of using referrals 
from research participants (Berg, 2004). All research participants met the criteria stated above, 
and the researcher asked current research participants to recommend potential candidates for the 
study. As the grounded theory methodology was executed the sampling strategy incorporated 
theoretical sampling, a classic sampling strategy of grounded theory. Glaser and Strauss (B. G. a. 
S. Glaser, A.L., 1967) define theoretical sampling as “the process of data collection for 
generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his data and decides 
what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges”. 
Grounded theory places the researcher as a subjective active participant in data 
generation with the participant (Birks & Mills, 2015). The raw data from the participants ground 
any developed abstraction or theory, but it is the researcher’s interpretation that constructs these 
abstractions and theories. Focus remained on understanding the meaning participants hold about 
the problem. It was possible through theoretical sensitivity that the scope of participants 
increased to include staff at participant organizations. 
The study investigated SHPO and the processes management exercises to make 
information security decisions. Interviews were the primary method for data generation. 
Interviews occurred over an overtly recorded teleconference medium to facilitate convenience, 
support honest responses and reduce participant error. The rigidity of the research setting 
reduced research variability and promoted research participant comfort and privacy. 
Charmaz (Charmaz, 2006) pointed out the orthodox accepted answer of how many 
participants are needed to reach saturation is not a number, but based on when gathering new 
data does not spark new theoretical insights. Therefore, this can be a small sample size, although 
the smaller the size and the larger the claim from the data, the greater scrutiny of credibility. 
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Creswell provides guidance to grounded theory researchers, based on Creswell’s (2014) review 
of qualitative studies, finding grounded theory typically needs 20-30 participants for saturation.  
Data Collection and Procedures 
IRB approval was obtained prior to collecting any data. This research involved human 
subjects as participants. 
All participants were provided a verbal informed consent detailing the purpose of this 
research, the type of research, why they were selected as a research participant, that participation 
was voluntary, the participant expectations, the duration of the participants engagement, the risks 
and benefits of participating, their right to withdraw from the research at any time, and how data 
was secured. Data security covers all attributes of the research, including the participants 
information, responses and data generated, and informs on how this data will remain confidential 
with purpose to protect the confidentiality, integrity and privacy of the data. 
Research participants were required to listen and acknowledge a verbal informed consent 
prior to interviewing. The research was conducted in accordance with the consent terms.  
The primary method of participant generated data collection was intensive interviewing. 
These interviews did not last more than one hour per session and occurred between September 
2018 and February 2019. An essential method of grounded theory is the ability for concurrent 
data generation and analysis (Birks & Mills, 2015). Results from this study were presented in 
March 2019, and data was generated and added to refine the developed theory very late in the 
research process. 
The researcher’s intent was to use one-on-one interview format. If an organization had 
more than one individual accountable for information security, all accountable individuals were 
interviewed in a focus group. The research unit of analysis is the business thus the intent was to 
avoid partial or conflicting responses from being collected. Focus group interviews have pros 
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and cons compared to individual interviews. Research has shown focus group interviews can 
provide a better understanding of complex processes because participants question and answer 
each other revealing more (Morgan, 1996). Additionally, Morgan (1996) points out the 
researcher can ask for experience comparisons allowing for richer understanding of the process.  
There was a risk of not receiving full responses from a participant during a focus group 
interview. Participants may have been reluctant to share stories of not having followed policy, 
circumventing process or other incriminating behavior that could result in sanction. Smithson 
(Smithson, 2000) points out there is a risk of a dominant voice in focus groups which can prevent 
alternative perspectives and experiences from being disclosed. The selection of interview or 
focus group for each participant engagement depended on setting and research needs.  
Grounded theory promotes unstructured and semi-structured interview question formats. 
Purposefully the researcher was attempting to generate data and interpret the interviewees 
experiences with minimal bias and avoid ‘forcing the data’ by using open-ended, unstructured 
questions to promote interviewee rich responses. Interpretive validity provisions were employed 
to promote trustworthiness and address bias. Interview sessions were overtly recorded. 
Participants and participant organizations were afforded confidentiality for this study. A 
secured cross-reference document was developed to support the researcher's ability to organize 
collected data and to allow for follow-up with participants as-needed. The cross-reference document 
was protected in accordance with this research study’s data security standards. 
It is important to point out, it was not possible in advance to tell where this grounded 
theory research would be directed, and the questions provided in advance may not have been 
sufficient to collect detail or focus on a salient, core point presented during an interview. The 
intention is this line of inquiry was followed. Any deviation from IRB approved protocols would 
seek out additional IRB approval before proceeding.  
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Data generated from participant responses was transcribed into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data 
analysis (QDA) software tool. Atlas.ti is a locally installed software package that assists 
researchers in coding and organizing data. Theoretical coding, category generation, comparison 
and abstraction were conducted within Atlas.ti. Research data security standards documented 
within this document apply to the data generated within Atlas.ti.  
Memos are another essential method employed in grounded theory. Memos are write-ups 
of ideas generated during the grounded theory process (B. G. Glaser, 1998). Following 
Schatzman and Strauss (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973) approach to memo writing, multiple memo 
types were utilized (see table below).  
Table 3 - Memoing standards (Schatzman & Strauss, 1973) 
Memo Type Function 
Observational Describe the actual events 
Theoretical Describe the researcher's thoughts about those events 
Analytical Thoughts from the data, or epiphany, reasons for codes, categories, theoretical sampling 
Methodological* Reminders about some procedural aspect of the research 
Dissertation* 
Ideas that relate to the dissertation, but are not grounded 
theory related (i.e. what defines a small business, 
literature review related) 
* not part of Schatzman and Strauss approach, but extended by the PI for memo types 
 
Glaser (B. G. Glaser, 1978) famously stated “all is data” in grounded theory. Memos are 
data; confirmed by Lempert (Lempert, 2007) as memos can be developed about earlier memos as 
abstraction is raised. Memos were developed throughout the research. They provided a 
chronological history of theory abstraction for retrospective investigation and support 
confirmability. Additionally, the researcher was able to utilize retrospectively the thought 
process and decision making from earlier parts of the research to understand how the current 
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state of understanding was at that time versus the present when more information would 
presumably be available. As a theory began to develop, the researcher utilized memos to review 
initial participant interviews and engagements to affirm the theory’s rigor or to modify the theory 
with the new insights obtained.  
Memos were documented and managed within Atlas.ti. Research data security standards 
documented within this document apply to the data generated within Atlas.ti. 
The role of the researcher is a factor in grounded theory research. Interview sessions 
position the researcher as a participant in the study. The researcher performs two roles: 
participant and observer. Participation manifested in engaging in conversation through a question 
and answer interview format. Observation manifested in noting situational aspects and settings.  
Data Analysis 
Analysis of data will be conducted throughout the project, starting early and occurring 
often. This concurrent collection and analysis are an essential method of grounded theory. 
Grounded theory’s purpose is to develop a theory that is grounded in the data collected from 
those experiencing the process. 
The grounded theory analysis process is systematic in nature. Birks and Mills (Birks & 
Mills, 2015) provide an informative diagram capturing this process (see Figure 1). This three-
phased process begins on the bottom of the diagram with purposive sampling and works upward 
through the process until theoretical integration occurs producing a grounded theory. 




Figure 1 - Essential grounded theory methods (Birks & Mills 2015) 
 
Phase one. Essential methods in the first phase are purposive sampling, initial coding, 
concurrent data collection and generation, theoretical sampling, constant comparative analysis 
and category identification. 
Purposive sampling. Purposive sampling provides an initial set of participant criteria 
coupled with interview question direction. These initial interviews were wide in scope but 
targeted at small healthcare business information security management decision related 
processes. Recruitment materials designed to target small healthcare providers in South Carolina 
were disseminated via LinkedIn and Twitter social media platforms. Snowballing sampling was 
also be utilized following initial interview sessions, as noted above. 
Initial coding. Initial coding of data was performed as data was collected. Concepts, 
themes, keywords, and language from transcriptions were identified and labeled. Coding 
provided a method to begin to identify patterns and areas of emphasis in the data. 
Research participants responses were transcribed into Atalsti. Initial coding occurred on these 
generated data.  
Concurrent data generation and collection. Concurrent data generation and collection, a 
key difference between grounded theory and other research methodologies, occurred throughout 
all phases. Data generation and data collection are methods to produce data for analysis, but 
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contrast in that data generation involves the researcher directly engaging the data source to 
produce materials for analysis while data collection has little to no researcher influence on the 
data source (Birks & Mills, 2015). 
Theoretical sampling. Theoretical sampling provides the mechanism to focus interviews 
and data collection to provide materials for comparative analysis to identify nuances of the 
process, continuing to ground any emerging theoretical value. Purposive and snowball sampling 
relate to the composition of the research participants in the study, however theoretical sampling 
is concerned with exploring and exhausting the composition of the emerging patterns and 
themes. Concepts and categories began to emerge as important or recurring. This began to direct 
an emerging theory and directed where to spend more time focusing during interviews. 
Constant Comparative Analysis. Rigorous comparative analysis, another essential 
method of grounded theory, ensures the developed theory is valid and the path the researcher 
takes to discover it is directed by the data. Furthermore, this comparative analysis reveals gaps in 
the data, aspects of the process being studied that remain unexplained or unexplored (Charmaz, 
2006). Participant to participant comparison were utilized as part of this method. Additionally, 
codes and categories applied to participants were compared to other participants to help identify 
emerging categories. 
Category identification. Categories are conceptual elements in a theory (B. G. a. S. 
Glaser, A.L., 1967). Charmaz (Charmaz, 2006) extends this definition by stating categories 
explicate ideas, events or processes in the data, and may subsume common themes and patterns 
in several codes. Birks and Mills (Birks & Mills, 2015) point out it is the grouping of codes that 
“leads to the formation of categories as the researcher begins to identify explanatory, conceptual 
patterns in their analysis”.  
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Phase two. Existing codes defined in phase 1 direct analysis for phase 2. The methods 
for analyzing data in the second phase of grounded theory, are intermediate coding, theoretical 
sensitivity, core category selection and theoretical saturation.  
Intermediation coding. Intermediate coding is comparing codes with codes, codes with 
categories and categories with categories. Organization of codes and categories begins to occur 
during comparison and relationships among them are constructed. During intermediate coding, 
codes and categories may be split into more specific codes and categories and categories may 
become sub-categories of an encompassing category. 
Theoretical Sensitivity. Birks and Mills (Birks & Mills, 2015) define theoretical 
sensitivity as the ability to recognize and extract from the data elements that have relevance for 
the emerging theory. Categories from phase 1 activities began to develop themes and emerging 
theories. These emerging theories were a lens to compare and analyze previous codes and 
interviews to shape the emerging theory. Categories including vendor reliance, what information 
security means to the business, and how responsibility is assigned all began emerging as 
theoretically relevant.  
Theoretical Saturation. Straus and Corbin (L. Strauss & Corbin, 1998) define theoretical 
saturation as the point in category development at which no new properties, dimensions, or 
relationships emerge during analysis. Saturation has occurred when a defendable theory has been 
developed grounded in the data. The final interviews provided additional data points that 
resonated with the developed theory. 
Core Category Selection. Constructivist’s grounded theory texts define the core category 
as an identified category that connects categories, subcategories and occurs frequently (Birks & 
Mills, 2015). Earlier grounded theory texts put more emphasis on a core category being an 
explicit category while newer research in the constructivist grounded theory epistemology 
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identify a core category as the interplay between categories and subcategories that provide the 
foundation for the developing theory (Charmaz, 2014). After identifying a core category and 
achieving theoretical saturation, phase 3 of Birks and Mill’s (2015) model can be executed. This 
phase contains the grounded theory methods of advanced coding and theoretical integration. This 
research adopted Charmaz’s (2014) definition of core category, using the primary categories and 
their interrelationship as the inputs to developing the theoretical ingratiation of a visual depiction 
of the theory. 
Phase three. The final phase of a grounded theory study is composed of advanced coding 
and theoretical integration where the final theory is developed and refined. 
Advanced coding. Advanced coding provides techniques for facilitating integration of the 
final theory. Advanced coding identifies connections between substantive codes developed 
during initial and intermediate coding. This provides an integration of the discovered data and 
the abstract concepts developed by the researcher.  
A common method is to use a storyline to write the developed theory (Birks & Mills, 
2015). The storyline explains the theory, implicitly explaining the studied phenomena. 
According to Charmaz (Charmaz, 2014) advanced coding is not a required method to 
successfully complete a grounded theory study, but can be useful.  
Theoretical integration. Theoretical integration is the consolidation of abstracted 
theoretical data into a final grounded theory. Birks and Mills (Birks & Mills, 2015) define a 
theory as an exploratory scheme comprising a set of concepts related to each other through 
logical patterns of connectivity According to Strauss (Strauss, 1987) theoretical integration is the 
most difficult part of a grounded theory research study. 
Critical to the entire process of grounded theory, memos are created, updated and 
reflected as the research goes from raw data to theoretical integration. Memos ensure 
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independent review of the research and can show the analytic path taken to reach conclusions 
and provide the researcher the ability to reflexively analyze work performed during the entire 
project.  
Ethical Considerations 
There are strategic, ethical and personal issues in qualitative research when a researcher 
is a participant (Locke, Spirduso, & Silverman, 2014). The researcher addressed these issues 
reflexively using Creswell’s (2014) approach by describing past experiences and how they may 
shape the researcher’s interpretation of the study. This is especially relevant in constructivist 
grounded theory because the developed theory was not discovered as the methodology was 
originally intended, but was constructed through the interpretation of the data by the researcher 
(Charmaz, 2006). Therefore, the experiences and biases help shape the theory. 
The researcher’s perceptions of small business information security and the healthcare 
industry have been shaped by the researcher’s professional and academic experience. The 
researcher has worked within the information security industry since October 2006 across 
multiple industries including federal, retail, services and healthcare. This diverse experience 
across multiple environments provides context of nuances for each sector. The researcher has 
worked within the healthcare industry since January 2016 as a senior information security 
analyst for a large healthcare provider in South Carolina. The researcher was involved in 
information security strategic planning, program management and risk assessment processes as a 
member of a healthcare provider information security office. The researcher has worked closely 
with senior leadership across all business functions, including compliance, finance, procurement, 
infrastructure and architecture.  
The researcher believed the knowledge obtained through the researcher’s professional 
and academic experience in the information security field coupled with the sensitivity the 
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researcher has developed for the healthcare industry prepared the researcher with a contextual 
understanding of challenges and issues that may affect this demographic. However, the 
researcher has never worked specifically with SHPOs. 
The researcher allowed the participants to shape the narrative of what the process was 
under study. The researcher experience was directly related to this area of study that makes 
researcher bias unavoidable. Every intention was made to be objective in collection and analysis, 
but it was the interpretation from the researcher's perspective that ultimately constructed the 
theory that was grounded in the data (Charmaz, 2000). Researchers’ assumptions are captured in 
the assumptions section. Collected data and its objective grounding were closely monitored if 
developing codes, categories, and theories began to support the assumptions identified prior to 
the research effort. 
Internal, sensitive or incriminating information may be disclosed during the research 
activity that could cause harm to the research participant personally or to the organization the 
research participant represents. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the researcher to instill trust 
and implement confidentiality processes to protect the participant. The researcher also explicitly 
informed participants not to disclose any known cyber incident experienced by the participant 
organization. 
Multiple techniques were employed to address these ethical considerations, convey trust 
and promote full, honest responses. IRB approval was sought prior to collecting any data. All 
research participants were required to read and acknowledge an informed consent form that 
clearly communicated their rights and expectations to privacy as a participant in the study. 
Participants and their organization were de-identified. A mapping tool identifying participants 
and organizations with their unique study identifier was maintained but with strict access 
controls and data at rest encryption. All data was protected in accordance with the research data 
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management plan. Where applicable, participants were afforded the opportunity to review, 
clarify and provide corrections on summaries of themes and codes from their interview session.  
The researcher would enter into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with research 
participants if the research participant organization required it. This assumed the NDA did not 
prevent any aspect of the data collection, analysis or findings disclosure. 
The researcher utilized a defer technique when a research participant inquired the 
interviewer about the interviewer’s views on a topic. For example, if a research participant were 
to ask, “what should I know about the HIPAA security rule”. The researcher would reply “I do 
not want to influence your responses. I’ll be happy to discuss upon the conclusion of this 
research study”, to avoid researcher and participant bias.  
Research Trustworthiness 
The reliability and validity of this qualitative research findings are dependent on the rigor 
applied to the research design to ensure trustworthiness of the findings. Much research has been 
performed in the area of defining constructs and provisions to ensure trustworthiness (Guba, 
1981; Lakshmi & Mohideen, 2013; Shenton, 2004; Sikolia, Biros, Mason, & Weiser, 2013), 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2014; Maxwell, 1992). 
Lakshmi and Mohideen (Lakshmi & Mohideen, 2013) provide a definition of internal and 
external validity. Internal validity encompasses whether the results of the study are legitimate 
because of the way the groups were selected, data was recorded, or analysis performed. External 
validity, often called "generalizability", involves whether the results given by the study are 
transferable to other groups (i.e. populations) of interest. 
Qualitative research requires trustworthiness through validity and reliability to support 
the credibility of the research (Golafshani, 2003). Validity and reliability are achieved through 
multiple criteria. Guba’s (Guba, 1981) four criteria for assessing trustworthiness are credibility, 
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transferability, dependability and confirmability. Sikolia et al. (Sikolia et al., 2013) focuses these 
four criteria to the realm of grounded theory research. Relative to this research, the criteria 
addressed below uses Sikolia et al.’s (2013) identified steps to improve trustworthiness across 
these dimensions:  
Credibility. Credibility refers to the accuracy with which collected data matches the 
multiple realities of the phenomena being studied and aligns with internal validity (Sikolia et al., 
2013). Credibility of this research is addressed below in the internal validity section, using 
Maxwell’s (Maxwell, 1992) sub-categories of internal validity to support the methods employed 
to ensure internal validity and credibility. 
Transferability. Transferability refers to the applicability of one set of findings to 
another setting and aligns to external validity (Sikolia et al., 2013). Grounded theory uses 
concurrent data collection and analysis. As abstraction occurs and a theory begins to emerge, 
previously collected data is compared to the developing theory to disprove aspects of the theory 
or refine the theory. Once theoretical saturation occurs, the transferability of the research is 
strengthened. 
Exhaustive detail of this research in a dissertation format and the documentation of 
supporting memos from the study supports transferability. These artifacts will be available upon 
request to any researcher wishing to understand, dispute or reproduce this work.  
The final report includes methods used for data generation and collection, analysis 
techniques performed and abstraction efforts. Individual and organizational participants were not 
disclosed as part of this external validity activity due to privacy and agreed upon conventions 
with research participants. 
Dependability. Dependability refers to the accuracy that the collected data represents the 
changing phenomena over time and is consistent over time, researcher and analysis techniques, 
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and aligns to reliability (Sikolia et al., 2013). Memos were documented to record researcher 
interpretations, research progress, participant interactions and other research related activities. 
These memos provided an account of the progress and path taken from raw data collection to 
grounded theory creation (Charmaz, 2014). Providing a historical account of the research 
progress strengthens dependability (Sikolia et al., 2013). 
Confirmability. Confirmability refers to the objectivity of the research and the ability for 
another researcher to confirm the same findings presented with the same data set. Similar to 
dependability, memos providing a rich historical account of the researches progress will be 
recorded and available with the research findings. This account provides to any outside 
researcher the complete context and steps this researcher processed through for repeatability or 
validation.  
Further supporting qualitative research trustworthiness, Maxwell (Maxwell, 1992) 
provides five validity criteria to consider in this research paradigm as identified in the credibility 
aspect. They are descriptive, interpretive, theoretical, evaluative validity and generalizability. 
Maxwell points out evaluative validity is not central to qualitative research and the basis of this 
research is grounded entirely in the data. This research makes no claim to evaluate the things 
studied to strengthen evaluative validity. Relative to this research, the criteria for the remaining 
four aspects is addressed below: 
Descriptive Validity. Maxwell (Maxwell, 1992) identifies this validity attribute as the 
most important aspect of validity in a qualitative study because all other validity aspects are 
dependent on the descriptive validity. Descriptive validity is the factual accuracy of the data to 
ensure the accounts of interviews and observations are not distorted or falsified. Descriptive 
validity is concerned with physical or behavioral events rather than their meaning to the 
participants (Kaplan, 1964).  
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Interviews were audio-recorded by the researcher. This ensured the ability to validate the 
accuracy of transcription. Upon completion of transcription, a review was executed to verify the 
transcription is consistent with the interview.  
Interpretive Validity. This research studies the experiences of the subjects participating 
in the studied processes. Interpretive accounts are grounded in the language of the people studied 
and rely as much as possible on their own words and concepts (Maxwell, 1992). Interpretive 
validity does not only apply to the conscious concepts of a participants, but can pertain to 
unconscious intentions, beliefs, concepts and values (Maxwell, 1992).  
Contributing to the credibility dimension of trustworthiness in grounded theory, Sikolia et 
al. (Sikolia et al., 2013) identifies techniques from the literature to promote interpretive validity 
utilized in the research including directing inquiry to expand on emerging theory and using 
participants language in the emerging theory. 
Theoretical Validity. Maxwell (Maxwell, 1992) identifies two major attributes of 
theoretical understanding. The first is the degree of abstraction from the actual studied 
phenomena. The second is the interpretation of the participants account as an explanation. He 
points out that theoretical validity is applying a theoretical construct to support explaining a 
relationship among concepts being studied. While he states theoretical validity “depends on 
whether there is a consensus in the community concerned with research about the terms used to 
describe the phenomena”, grounded theory looks to define a theory based on data collected from 
participants involved with the studied phenomena. As research progresses and theoretical 
abstraction occurs, theoretical sensitivity will be employed to direct interviews and research 
participants will define the concepts being identified and will accept or reject the relationships as 
they begin to emerge. 
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Generalizability. Generalizability refers to the extent an account of a situation can be 
applied to other settings and population (Maxwell, 1992). A requirement of grounded theory is 
theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation is the situation where additional data collected does 
not add to or refute any part of the developed theory (Birks & Mills, 2015). Theoretical 
saturation therefore indicates for a population of a similar demographic the theory would be 
applicable, and therefore generalizable. Extending the theory to other populations where 
variables of the demographic are changed to test the applicability of the theory is left as future 
work. 
Provisions developed by Shenton (Shenton, 2004) provide techniques to strengthen 
qualitative research internal validity. Several of these provisions were implemented in this 
research study. These provisions and the applicable to this research are: 
• Adoption of well-established research methods (i.e. grounded theory) 
• Data triangulation - This research intended to interview at least nine participants. Any 
data that drives theory will be from multiple sources. Triangulation is defined as “a 
validity procedure where researchers search for convergence among multiple and 
different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study” (Cresswell & 
Miller, 2000). 
• Honesty from respondents - Addressed in participant, site and sampling section of this 
chapter 
• Negative case analysis – Grounded theory does this by the nature of its approach to refine 
the developing theory and concurrently apply collected data to it to ensure 
appropriateness. 
EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY 
 54 
• Thick descriptions of experienced phenomena - Charmaz’s (2014) approach to grounded 
theory uses action verbs in all coding and categories to promote thick descriptions and 
provide narrative capabilities to theories as they emerge. 
• Researcher background and bias disclosure - The researcher’s relevant background and 
experience are documented in this research design. Researcher assumptions and the role 
of the researcher have been documented above. Efforts to limit researcher bias were 
explicitly utilized. 
• Frequent debriefing sessions - This research is part of a dissertation project, therefore the 
PI has a chair monitoring and supervising all research activities. Throughout the research 
process the chair was debriefed and had the opportunity to inject comments and concerns 
to avoid issues with trustworthiness. 
• Reflective commentary - Grounded theory uses memos as a foundational element of the 
research design. These memos are created throughout the research process and provide 
the capability for reflection on thought processes, findings and research process for all 
elements of the research study. 
Participant and Research Bias 
Interviews between a researcher and participants constitute a major component of 
collected data. Considerations related to the researcher and the participant must be addressed to 
mitigate the suspicion of the research findings appropriateness. These considerations and their 
corresponding mitigations are listed: 
Participant error. Participant error are factors that adversely impact how a participant 
performs. This could result from a participant being interviewed while their boss is in the room 
and wanting to not answer honestly or completely. This risk was mitigated with multiple 
techniques. First the researcher ensured only those participants that are accountable for 
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information security at the participant organization are involved during the interview session. 
Secondly, the participants had an opportunity to review and verify responses for accuracy. This 
follow up provides an opportunity for the participant to correct or expand on any responses. 
Participant Bias. Participant bias is any factor that produces false data. Participants may 
not be truthful in their responses for multiple reasons including providing responses they believe 
to be desirable to the researcher or socially acceptable. The researcher mitigated this risk by 
ensuring effective communication to participants of the purpose of the study, the necessity of full 
and truthful responses, the anonymity of the participants involvement in the study, and 
confidentiality being applied to their responses. 
Researcher Error. Researcher error is any factor that alters the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data. Validity aspects of the research study were utilized to limit researcher 
error. Additionally, memos were recorded throughout the entire study to provide a chronological 
history of research progress and theory development. 
Researcher Bias. Researcher bias is the influence on a study based on the researcher’s 
assumptions or desire for the study’s results. Researcher bias was a legitimate risk that was 
addressed to maintain trustworthiness of the study findings based on the researchers experience 
in the information security field and the healthcare industry. 
The research study’s PI worked for a medical university within the state of South 
Carolina, effectively a competitor to participants businesses. Two approaches were incorporated 
into the research design to address potential conflict of interest and introduction of researcher 
bias. These approaches were:  
• Verbal informed consent disclosed this association to research participants.  
• Research participants were provided aggregated, anonymized data of the research 
findings upon conclusion of the research.  
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These activities were designed to avoid any conflict of interest or scrutiny over the validity 
and reliability of the results from this study.  
Assumptions 
Assumptions the researcher had about what may be discovered during the study or what 
factors are influencing information security program management decisions are documented in 
the research design. The PI had no prior experience with SHPOs and therefore brought no 
assumptions of findings into the research.  
The following lists researcher assumptions: 
1. Small business health care providers are aware of HIPAA  
2. Small businesses are aware of the necessity of implementing security controls but due to 
a lack of understanding on how to implement or a lack of understanding on the scope of 
threat vectors, choose not to implement. 
3. Availability is the primary security objective of interest to small business health care 
providers.  
4. Healthcare providers recognize HIPAA as applicable legislation, but value it as ‘not 
having teeth’ and therefore do not feel compelled or motivated to comply.  
5. The experience of a cyber-attack on an organization makes the hypothetical a reality and 
shifts attitude of information security control priority to a small business. 
6. Small businesses believe they are too small a target to cyber criminals to be targeted. 
Any findings that align with predisposed assumptions were validated with additional 
rigor to verify the applicability of the finding. 
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Limitations 
The definition of small within the context of SHPO is a limitation elected by the 
researcher. There is currently limited research on small healthcare providers and there is no 
consensus-based, accepted definition for healthcare provider organization sizes. Healthcare 
providers organization size are measured multiple ways depending on the organization or 
research group measuring them. SBA bases size on generated revenue, dependent on business-
type as defined by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). Healthcare 
providers, specifically “Offices of Physicians (except Mental Health Specialists) NAICS Code: 
621111” are considered small if they generate less than $11M annually (SBA, 2018). It is not 
unreasonable to consider a 10-physician healthcare provider in a very affluent region, offering 
very expensive procedures to exceed $11M annually. This would exclude them as a SHPO, 
despite their staff size.  
The American Medical Association (Kane, 2017) conducted research and found that 
more than half of all healthcare providers in the United States have 10 or less physicians on staff. 
This quantified value represents a majority of healthcare providers in the United States and is a 
staff headcount consistent with an organization that would be in the target demographic. 
Therefore 10 physicians or fewer on staff was defined as part of the demographic requirement 
for in-scope research participant organizations. 
The PI lived in Charleston, SC. Limiting research participants location to South Carolina 
was a geographical limitation of the researcher’s ability to reasonably conduct research. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter documents the research protocol for this study. It presents a detailed 
description of the population to be included in the research, the methods to collect and generate 
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data, and the methods for analysis documented. Research findings aligned to the identified 
processes. 
The research approach utilized interviews, focus groups, memo writing, concurrent data 
generation and analysis as methods to develop raw data. The PI was positioned as a participant in 
the research, conducting unstructured interviews initially and transitioning into semi-structured 
interviews after thematic categories begin to develop from initial and intermediate coding 
activities, allowing individuals to share their views. The immersion into the setting of the 
participant and the open-ended approach to interview questions provided participants unfettered 
opportunity to express subjective meaning of their experiences (Crotty, 1998). 
There was little research on information security at SHPO, requiring exploratory 
research. Grounded theory is a suitable research methodology for exploratory research designs. 
This research has a defined research participant population and setting for conducting the 
interviews, the primarily employed research method. Grounded theory provides systematic data 
analysis procedures that were executed to process through the grounded theory methodology.  
Research trustworthiness, ethical considerations and biases were accounted for and were 
documented to provide rigor to the final research deliverable.  
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
This qualitative research studies factors affecting cyber security decisions at SHPOs in 
South Carolina. Grounded theory techniques were utilized to inductively develop a theory 
explaining the operational processes associated with these decisions and why these organization 
types have challenges securing their assets. 
This exploratory research provided visibility into an area currently with little literature. 
Additionally, it can facilitate additional informed research for SHPOs. 
This chapter presents the key findings from nine intensive interviews with personnel accountable 
for information security at their organization. The key findings interrelationship is discussed to 
support the theory generated from the grounded theory methodology. 
 First the composition and execution of the research is presented. This includes details on 
research participants, operational execution of the research, and the evolution of the coding 
activities during research. Next six key findings are presented that directly support and interrelate 
with the developed theory. Following this, the developed theory is presented and explained in 
totality. This chapter ends with discussion of the theory and key findings. 
Further promoting confidentiality, any reference to third-party vendors in this report are 
replaced by fictitious company names based on the Greek alphabet (i.e. Alpha, Beta).  
Methods 
Research Participants. IRB approval was required for this research due to the inclusion 
of human subjects. Dakota State University IRB reviewed this research protocol and determined 
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the best course of action would be for the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) IRB to 
provide this function. IRB approval was issued by MUSC for this research. IRB approval can be 
referenced in Appendix C. 
An IRB approved social media marketing campaign was initially used for participant 
solicitation. Additionally, the researcher contacted the president of the South Carolina Medical 
Group Management Association (SCMGMA), a professional association composed of healthcare 
practices from across South Carolina (SCMGMA, 2019). This is an ideal association to identify 
in-scope participants. The PI engaged leadership at SCMGMA to share the research study and 
act as a medium for soliciting their members as research participants. Six of the research 
participants were either directly acquired through this organization or from snowball sampling 
from a participant initially identified through SCMGMA. 
There were fourteen candidates that were engaged for participation (see Table 4). There 
were nine research participants interviewed for this study. Some participants were from the same 
city, but the population represented a diversity of areas within South Carolina. Furthermore, the 
participants represented a range of healthcare provider organization types including, but not 
limited to, pain management specialists, dermatology, and surgical practices. 
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The state of South Carolina is geographically divided into four regions: Upstate, 
Midlands, Lowcountry, and Pee Dee. The figure below from SCDHEC illustrates the allocation 
of these regions (SCDHEC, 2019). The participant table below includes the region of each 
participant. 
The following table provides demographic data of the information security responsible 
personnel (IRP) participant population and assigned pseudonyms. Unexpectedly multiple 
candidates spoke with me during recruitment and were interested in participating. However, they 







Figure 2 - South Carolina regions 
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Table 4 - Participant demographics 
ID Name IRP Role SHPO Type SC Region Status 
1 "PR1" Practicing Physician Otolaryngology Pee Dee 




Unable to establish 
communication to 
recruit. 
2 "PR2" Director of Operations Family Medicine Pee Dee 
Initially believed to 
meet participant 
criteria, but had more 
than 10 providers. 
3 "PR3" Practice Administrator Pain Management Midlands Study Participant 
4 "PR4" Practice Manager Pain Management Pee Dee 
Did not attend 
interview. Ceased 
communication. 
5 "PR5" Practicing Physician Rhinoplasty Lowcountry Study Participant 
6 "PR6" Managing Director Polysomnography Pee Dee Study Participant 
7 "PR7" Practice Administrator Dermatology Midlands Study Participant 
8 "PR8" Practicing Physician Anesthesiology Lowcountry Study Participant 
9 "PR9" CFO Oncology Lowcountry Study Participant 
10 "PR10" Practice Administrator Dermatology Lowcountry Study Participant 
11 "PR11" Practice Administrator Dental Lowcountry 
Did not attend 
interview. Ceased 
communication. 
12 "PR12" Practice Administrator General Surgery Pee Dee Study Participant 
13 "PR13" Manager Dermatology Pee Dee 
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ID Name IRP Role SHPO Type SC Region Status 
14 "PR14" Practice Manager Clinic Lowcountry Study Participant 
15 “PR15” Practicing Physician Anesthesiology Upstate 





Research Execution. All interviews were executed in accordance with IRB 
requirements. All interviews were conducted over the phone via a WebEx connection and lasted 
between 45-60 minutes. The ability to conduct a “face-to-face” video teleconference was offered 
and only one participant elected to participate. All other interviews were audio only. All 
interviews were recorded, and the participants were aware and agreed to being recorded. 
Every interview began with a preamble to ensure participant rights and awareness. This 
preamble was IRB approved. The preamble was: 
Thank you for your time and speaking with me. I am a doctoral candidate. I 
currently work at the Medical University of South Carolina, researching small 
business healthcare cybersecurity decision processes. I would like to talk in 
generalities to get an understanding of the types of security issues you may face. 
I do not want to know explicitly if your company has had a successful breach or 
experienced a successful cyber-attack. 
The information provided will remain strictly confidential and you will 
not be identified by your answers. You and your company’s name will not be 
disclosed in any way. Data will be compiled with no individual responses tied to 
your name or any identifying information about you. I would like to record this 
interview. All information disclosed during our conversation will be kept in a 
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secure location. You may choose not to answer any question. Do you have any 
questions before we get started? Are you willing to participate? 
I will begin recording this interview session now. 
A semi-structured interview protocol was utilized to manage the interview. The interview 
guide, Appendix B, had ice breaker questions, information security program questions, ending 
questions, and probes to elicit more information. Information security program questions were 
focused on threats, financial factors, regulatory influences, and decision-making processes. If a 
participant mentioned an item that was an emerging concept, based on coding practices, probes 
were used to explore this topic further. 
Completed recordings were transcribed and imported into Atlas.ti, a qualitative data 
analysis tool.  Analysis began immediately following the import of the first interview. Analysis 
continued throughout entire research execution. 
Coding. Coding provides a method to begin to identify patterns and areas of emphasis in 
the data. Concepts, themes, keywords, and language from transcriptions are identified and 
labeled. Initial coding covered a large area of topics. Several codes identified initially did not 
persist through research analysis. Codes that did not persist were either absorbed into like codes 
that captured the essence of the concept or were isolated codes that were interesting but did not 
support or resonate with emerging categories. 
The researcher began comparing and contrasting the codes themselves after initial coding 
the first 4 interviews. There were over 100 codes at this phase of analysis. Reviewing codes and 
abstracting them with regards to what the code was referring to or a property of resulted in the 
emergence of categories. These categories, called code groups in Atlas.ti, served as logical 
grouping of codes. This further allowed for analysis and logical thinking of what was happening 
in the data. Subsequent interviews followed the same protocol, but areas of emergence would be 
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further probed for properties and dimensions from the participant if they surfaced during the 
interview. 
Codes were compared to codes to determine if they were different codes, but 
conceptually the same. If they were conceptually identical, the codes were merged. An example 
of this was “hacker as a threat” and “fear of someone out there on the Internet attacking us” 
being merged to “hacker as a threat”.  
Codes were compared to concepts, concepts to categories, categories to categories, 
concepts to concepts to promote abstraction of concepts and understand relationships among 
these pieces as the coding process progressed. 
The activity of coding interviews then comparing and contrasting codes to codes and 
codes to categories happened several times throughout the research. As coding continued several 
thematic areas began to emerge. Grounded theory seeks a core category to allow for further 
analysis to refine and illuminate. The core category is the relationship and propagated 
assumptions SHPOs have about their IT providers coupled with the organizations narrow 
concept of what comprises information security. 
Codes and categories were revisited to analyze their property or value with respect to this 
core category. Following the identification of the core category, codes that did not relate were 
disregarded during further analysis. Previously coded interviews were revisited following core 
category to identify data that relates. This was a useful activity as each time reviewing transcripts 
with a different perspective or focus resulted in “seeing” more relevant data points. 
At the completion of the research there were 136 codes and 17 categories. These codes 
and categories can be referenced in Appendix D. 
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Findings 
A data summary table, Appendix G was constructed based on Bloomberg and Volpe 
(Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012) with emergent categories that provided dimension to the core 
category. The descriptors were: risk-based program, security seen as privacy, Trust IT vendor 
with security, reliance on vendor, risk analysis performed, self-confidence in security program 
effectiveness, support for HIPAA, support for operating in a secure and compliant manner. These 
descriptors drove the findings documented below. Based on these findings, a theory was 
developed that explains why information security at SHPOs has limited effectiveness despite 
internal and external factors. 
The final three interviews utilized the same interview guide used as previous interviews. 
However, as theoretically relevant topics would come up, such as the reliance and trust of the 
vendor, the participants perspective of how security related to privacy, and the execution of risk 
analysis activities were all further discussed to support theoretical sensitivity and saturation. 
Six major findings that directly support the constructed theory emerged from the study. 
These findings are:  
1. Limited IT and information security knowledge - An overwhelming majority of 
participants (7/9 or 78%) self-identify as having limited understanding of IT and 
information security.  
2. IT vendor trust and reliance - An overwhelming majority of participants (7/9 or 78%) 
trust and are reliant on their IT vendors explicitly for IT knowledge and expertise and 
implicitly for information security knowledge and expertise.  
3. Assuming IT vendors provide security - A majority of participants assume security (6/9 
or 67%) is inclusively part of IT and therefore is provided by their IT vendor.  
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4. Narrow definition of security - A significant number of participants (5/9 or 56%) have a 
narrow view of information security, seeing it as a privacy or confidentiality activity 
only.  
5. Information security program confidence – Nearly all participants (8/9 or 89%) are 
confident in the effectiveness of their currently constituted information security program 
and have internal drive to invest and add controls to reduce risk to acceptable levels.  
6. IT is outsourced – Nearly all participants (8/9 or 89%) outsource their IT operations. 
The following provides supporting data for these findings. The utilized research 
methodology employed intensive interviews from participants living the experiences. Quotations 
from the participants are utilized to illustrate the nuances of the findings. Specific quotations are 
not selected because they best make the case for the finding (i.e. “cherry-picking”) but are 
selected to represent the attitude of the participant population relative to the finding. 
Finding 1. An overwhelming majority of participants (7/9 or 78%) self-identify as 
having limited understanding of IT and information security. Several participants explicitly 
shared this admission and others implicitly did through describing their reliance on their 
outsourced IT vendors to support their business and business decisions. None of the participants 
responsible for information security at the businesses were acting in an IT role or had an IT 
education related background. Many saw the inclusion of IT as a necessity for operating their 
business. 
Many participants shared varying responses about their knowledge base of IT and 
information security, all which indicated a gap. PR12 described her knowledge with technology 
specifically as: “I’m not good with technology. I mean, I put up with it because we have to do it” 
(PR12). 
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The individual responsible is often times a business manager and administrator who 
“owns” the responsibility despite the gap in knowledge. This results in guessing best course of 
action. PR7 shared her responses when staff members approach her about rules on inter-
organizational communication of PHI:  
I’m not an IT expert so I have to make the best decisions that I can and 
sometimes it’s more on the safe side even though it might be okay I just say 
maybe don’t do that until I have further information on how to do that 
appropriately. I’d rather be safe than sorry. (PR7) 
Most participants have not sought additional information security education to make 
better decisions, but rather relied entirely upon their IT vendor. Some participants commented 
hearing about information security related events from the news or colleagues, but this is only 
incidental. PR9 shared on what information he uses to stay informed on information security: “I 
keep up with, you know—every now and then I’ll read newsletters just enough to be dangerous 
and get scared with the cyber security and all of the breaches that are out there” (PR9). 
Multiple participants commented on the rate that technology evolves exceeds their ability 
to gain knowledge in it. This factor promotes the persistence of these individuals having limited 
IT knowledge. Participants indicated they have several areas of responsibility that makes 
maintaining an understanding of IT and information security very difficult. PR7’s comments 
illustrate this reality when asked if information security was not a priority at her business: 
I maybe a little bit yeah I would say but not intentionally not a priority not that 
I know it’s a risk but I’m going to kick it to the bottom of the list but I think 
the physicians have a lot on their plate and I guess it’s my job to worry about 
that and figure out how to make sure’s safe and secure and all that.  
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I handle a lot of different areas it’s hard to be an expert in every single 
area I got to be an expert in the financial side of it in using our bookkeeping 
software and speaking with the accountants and making sure we’re on the up 
and up about with their bookkeeping software and our taxes in the way I’m 
processing payroll and paying our physicians and then I have to worry about 
the operational side is my clinic functioning properly are we efficient. Am I, 
you know that I have to worry about the customer service part of it are my 
patients happy are we training in retraining our front desk employees about 
how to handle tough situations with patients and get them what they need.  
Then I’m worried about speaking with my attorneys and thinking about 
legal risk and then there’s the cyber part  I think it’s difficult to be an expert in 
every area’s and think about all the stuff and I think with the cyber part of it is 
that a changes and evolves so much faster then anything else that it’s difficult 
to keep up with that also (PR7) 
Multiple participants shared comments at the end of interviews that the activity of the 
interview resulted in an increase in knowledge about information security. Specifically, one 
participant stated: “Doing this discussion with you has certainly helped me to think about that 
collect my thoughts on that” (PR5). Another participant shared specifically: “No, you have asked 
some good questions made me think about things and how we do things” (PR6). Another 
commented:  
Yeah I guess there are several things that I haven’t sat and talked about cyber 
security this long in my role maybe ever, but  yeah I think you are making me 
think about it harder than I did before and what I need to do about it. I think 
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I’ve been a little bit more reactive to things then more proactive it is a big deal 
but yeah I don’t think I’ve ever talked or thought about it this long or hard so. 
(PR7) 
The finding of limited IT and information security knowledge for IRP supports Finding 2. 
Finding 2. An overwhelming majority of participants (7/9 or 78%) trust and are reliant 
on their IT vendors explicitly for IT knowledge and expertise and implicitly for information 
security knowledge and expertise. One participant that this finding did not apply to was fully “on 
paper” and did not utilize IT as typically seen in today’s SHPOs. Detailed in Finding 6 below, no 
participant businesses had in-house IT staff; nearly all outsourced their IT business needs, except 
one with no IT. Particularly given the limited IT knowledge of respondents, the amount of trust 
and reliance on the IT vendor is significant. Indeed, all participants conveyed their reliance on 
their IT vendor in their business operations. In fact, one participant shared that since the IT 
vendor handles security, the business therefore implicitly trusts the vendor to implement 
effective information security controls at their practice: “Again the IT firm handles that, so I trust 
them. They know to what degree we need to be protected” (PR6). This trust and reliance were 
not founded on contractual protections or described thoroughness of the IT vendor’s approach to 
information security but rather on the IT vendor’s positive reputation within the local business 
community. 
In addition, several participants shared their business need to rely on their IT vendors 
because of their own limited knowledge and broad scope and priority of the participant’s 
responsibilities. PR12 commented:  
That’s my responsibility here in the office: to make sure that things run 
smoothly within the office. When it comes to technology and cyber security I 
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have to—because I’m not familiar with it I have to rely on companies like 
Alpha and Beta that they’re doing their job. (PR12) 
PR12 later in the interview made a comment that indicated her reliance on their 
IT vendors was an appealing relationship: “We don’t want to be thinking about 
technology. We just want to know that our technology’s working, that the patients are 
safe” (PR12).  
PR7’s comments echoed many participants, further supported by finding one: “But I 
guess it was my background in healthcare administrations. I rely heavily on my vendors to help 
me make sure my stuff is safe”. (PR7) 
Further developed in Finding 3, IT vendors are not only trusted and relied upon for IT but 
also information security. PR9 commented:  
I generally rely on my IT guy here that I really trust. I usually ask him, if he 
suggests a particular mitigation strategy, to give me a couple of vendors and 
the pluses and minuses of both as well as the cost of each, and then we move 
forward based on that information. (PR9) 
When further questioned as to why IT vendors are trusted and relied upon for security, 
many participants indicated this was simply “trust,” transitively extending positive experiences 
and reputation in IT to provide security services. Perhaps IT vendors reinforce this trust by 
“talking security” to practice’s representative, who unfortunately has limited knowledge of the 
topic. Therefore, the IT vendor may legitimize their position as knowledgeable, reliant, and 
trustworthy despite their actual information security knowledge level. PR9’s comments directly 
above were followed up with the question “why do you trust the vendor?” PR9 stated: “You 
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know, it’s hard to put your finger on it, but sometimes you can just talk to somebody and just 
realize that they know what they’re doing” (PR9). 
The implicit trust extended to IT vendors was often seen as an assumption of acceptable 
levels of execution. PR5 commented on how cyber security factored into his decision on trusting 
a vendor:  
I guess there were a couple decisions. Did they seem legitimate company, it 
wasn’t something a little bit shady and I had questions, so I kind of put that 
trust in there that they were going to follow through with whatever the standard 
for information technology and security and just trust that was there to start 
with, for me personally I don’t know the specifics and ins and outs that would 
be done on a technical level. So, I wasn’t really interested in asking those 
questions to make comparisons, for me it was more about the product itself. 
(PR5) 
All participants are forced to extend some level of trust to third party vendors since they 
outsource their IT operations. Trust and reliance seem tightly coupled for the participants with 
respect to their IT vendors. Furthermore, it seems the greater the general reliance the greater 
degree of trust about information security is required. While a majority of participants indicated 
they collaborate on information security decisions with their IT vendor, they acknowledged that 
the IT vendor was the driver of the decision itself. 
Finding 3. A majority of participants (6/9 or 67%) assumed information security to be 
part of IT and therefore provided by their IT vendor. The IRP’s limited knowledge of IT and 
information security fosters the trust and reliance in their IT vendor. This extends the perceived 
scope of the IT vendor’s service offering to include security.  
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It was unknown by most participants if contractual language with IT vendors included 
explicit terms for security related services. IT vendors are providing and maintaining technology 
(i.e. workstations, servers, printers, network devices) that most often have some security controls 
fundamentally incorporated. For example, it is fairly standard for any modern workstation to 
require a username and password to login to the computer, and also for critical applications to be 
user-specific password protected. This is an information security control and one that an IT 
vendor would be associated with from a participant’s perspective. This results in participants 
making the association of their IT vendor with information security as a general fact, despite the 
fact that information security extends beyond IT to include operational and administrative 
controls.  
One participant comment concisely echoed many of the participants position: “Again the 
IT firm handles that, so I trust them. They know to what degree we need to be protected” (PR6). 
While PR6 stated he collaborated with his IT vendor on information security related decisions, 
he made multiple comments suggesting the collaboration was more of a governance role. 
Strengthening this commonality, PR7 shared “...from our cyber security in general I rely a lot on 
my IT vendor…” (PR7). 
Another participant’s comments clearly demonstrated the implicit extension of security to 
the IT vendor. When asked how cyber security related investment decisions are made and what 
evidence or metrics are leveraged to inform that decision, PR9 shared: 
I generally rely on my IT guy here that I really trust. I usually ask him, if he 
suggests a particular mitigation strategy, to give me a couple of vendors and 
the pluses and minuses of both as well as the cost of each, and then we move 
forward based on that information. (PR9) 
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The IRP’s limited knowledge of IT and information security fosters the trust and reliance 
in their IT vendor. This extends the perceived scope of the IT vendor’s service offering to 
include security.  
Finding 4. A significant number of participants (5/9 or 56%) have a narrow view of 
information security, seeing it as a privacy or confidentiality activity only. A majority of 
participants had a primary cyber security concern of suffering a data breach and their focus for 
security control was around protecting the confidentiality of PHI, often referred to 
interchangeably by participants as patient information.  
Participants responded in different ways about their cyber security concerns, but the 
majority were concerned with a patient privacy breach and compromise of confidentiality. PR9 
discussed his fear with physicians at his practice losing their mobile phone because (against 
policy) they text patient information and this could result in a breach. PR12 discussed her 
concerns of having patient information on a display or print out, face up on desk and being seen 
by unauthorized parties. PR7 put it plainly when asked her primary concern from a cybersecurity 
perspective: “Primarily I am always worried about my patient’s information” (PR7). 
Interpretation of HIPAA by the participants demonstrated it was viewed as regulation to 
promote privacy and confidentiality of PHI. This further supports the motivation of the practices 
to seek out controls to promote confidentiality. HIPAA has both a security rule and a privacy 
rule. Based on participant responses, the security rule has the goal of achieving and maintaining 
confidentiality in support of the privacy rule. PR5 shared his thoughts on HIPAA that 
demonstrates the scoping of his interpretation of the legislation:  
There are things that I guess are sort of these rules that have to be followed or 
penalties for not following those, that seem maybe not strict but the potential 
harm in having that information get out into the wrong hands is really 
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significant. And I do believe personal health information is very something 
that is critically important to protect. It’s something that should be private and 
should be held private especially as technology evolves over the years it 
becomes very hard to kind of keep up with all that. (PR5) 
Some participants discussed protected staff information and financial information as 
assets to secure, but patient information was regularly referenced by participants as the critical 
asset requiring security.  
Finding 5. Nearly all participants (8/9 or 89%) are confident in the effectiveness of their 
currently constituted information security program. This was an unexpected finding given that 
research suggests healthcare businesses identify as having shortcomings in information security 
posture (Institute, 2016; Martin, Martin, Hankin, Darzi, & Kinross, 2017). 
Many participants believe their initial and continuing information security controls and 
posture are adequate. Participants (6/9 or 67%) stated they would make changes as needed but in 
more of a reactive manner than proactive manner, or to say it bluntly, nothing bad has happened 
that they are aware of so their information security must be appropriate. PR12 commented: 
Cyber security doesn’t really come around here. that’s why it’s so—it’s kind of 
weird. Because I’m like yeah, we really don’t think about that. I mean, we did. 
We have everything in place. I’m sure changes are going to happen, you know, 
but they don’t happen like instantly. Something needs to happen it’ll happen…. 
Now, if the computers are running slow or if we feel like somebody hacked, 
that’s when, you know, we start thinking about oh, shoot, something’s 
happening, you know, we need to get in touch with our IT department or, you 
know, cyber, you know, security and stuff like that. But we don’t really—it’s 
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not something that we think about. Now, maybe because we’re confident that 
we are safe. (PR12) 
Finding 3 justifies this finding in that participant organizations are viewing the scope of 
their IT vendors responsibility to include security. The IRP accepts security is properly addressed 
through their IT vendor, whom has established the IRP’s trust and reliance (Finding 2). 
Therefore, the IRP feels confident in the information security posture.  
When discussing with PR6, who stated his IT vendor handles information security, what 
the frequency for meeting and discussing information security was between the IRP and the IT 
vendor, it was revealed that security was initially technically implemented and normal operating 
practices were to hold security related meetings in an ad hoc reactive nature to incidents.  
Yes, it's more ad hoc as needed most of the time when we have conversations 
it’s because maybe the Internet you know there's a problem with one of the 
servers or something not the server maybe one of the backups, somethings 
wrong with it. Or we have, we use software that does diagnostic testing 
sometimes it's problems with that that we have to work out those problems can 
pop up about anytime but with our firm though they have a firm grasp on what 
we need and what we expect and they're very good at taking care of our needs 
so it’s the security part is not one that comes up a lot because we have the 
understanding that we need to do whatever it takes to make sure we're secure. I 
think, again I lean heavily on them to make sure we, everything is good I have 
confidence that they follow the best practice. (PR6) 
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Based on PR6’s responses, the ad hoc services are related to traditional IT functions (i.e. 
break/fix) and less information security risk management. This underlines likely misplaced 
confidence in the program while highlighting why the misunderstood perception would be made.  
Some participants were confident in their current security program while contradictorily 
stating they knew of gaps in their security and areas of improvement but choosing not to take 
action to mitigate. Specifically, when asked about his practice’s security control effectiveness 
PR5 stated:  
 I think they are effective, they are fairly effective in practice, but there are 
things that could certainly be improved upon for sure that probably the most 
succinct way to answer that. Like I said we haven’t had any issues, or at least 
nothing I’m aware of and I would assume if there were anything of 
consequence or significance that would have had showed itself.  
I know we have the most basic things in place, I feel comfortable with 
that. But there are certainly weak points or points where we may not be 
following exactly the right protocols or things like that that need to be 
improved upon. I wouldn’t say it isn’t perfect, certainly. I don’t think you can 
ever say anything is perfect because it needs to evolve, but I wouldn’t say the 
security protocols are great. I would say they are good, they have been 
effective and are currently effective the way we are using them but certainly 
need to be reviewed and improved upon. Even if I didn’t think that now, I 
would at least from time to time, whether its annually or whenever, there’s an 
importance to looking at that more routinely. (PR5) 
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Two participants were confident in their security program’s effectiveness while 
acknowledging there was room for growth.  
Finding 6. Nearly all participants (8/9 or 89%) outsource their IT operations. This 
includes IT professional services and cloud-based software solutions (e.g. EHR). This finding 
applied to all participating practices, except for one that was fully “on paper” and did not utilize 
IT as typically seen in today’s SHPOs.  
This business decision is rooted in the organizations needing IT for business operations. 
Outside of clinical operations most participant organizations outsource ancillary services 
including payroll, legal, marketing, etc. 
Outlined in Finding 3, the IT vendor has high importance and impact on the security of the 
organization. Participants are not evaluating IT vendors for their security ability or ensuring 
security is factored into contract language. Often times the relationship is based on a trusted 
referral. Only one organization had elected to have a dedicated IT outsourced staff member 
present on-site full time to provide timely access to an IT resource. 
Theory 
The “flashlight in a dark room theory” is based upon research findings, utilizing 
grounded theory methods. The overarching theory shows organizations outsource IT operations 
in a trusting and reliant relationship, confident their IT vendor is effective, partially due to their 
own limited technology and security knowledge. Security is implicitly perceived as an IT 
function and through transitive properties organizations establish confidence in the effectiveness 
and appropriateness of their security implementation. This results in an organization’s perceived 
cyber risk exposure not aligning with its actual exposure  
Metaphorically speaking, organizations are using a flashlight in a dark room of cyber 
risk. The space that is illuminated represents their understanding of what cyber risk is and the 
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controls they have implemented to mitigate the risk, but this does not account for the cyber risk 
that is not illuminated. 
 
Figure 3 - Flashlight in a dark room theory 
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The theory is presented in a quasi-entity-relationship diagram (ERD). The entities and 
relationships in the diagram refer to findings or thematic areas that emerged from the research. 
The following explains in greater detail the entity and relationship elements in the diagram. 
The IRP represents the research participant interviewed. Recall this research required the 
interviewing of the individual that is responsible and accountable for information security at the 
practice. This was always an individual that did not have formal IT training. 
Limited IT and information security knowledge were a universal characteristic of the 
IRP. This was self-proclaimed explicitly by some participants and implicitly by others. This 
concept influences how the IRP understands the scope of security and the function of IT within 
the context of an organization’s information security program. 
IRPs consistently demonstrated a desire to be as secure as possible meaning their 
organizational information security controls are sufficient to protect the organizations data assets 
and to be compliant with HIPAA. 
The limited related knowledge to the IRP supports the finding that IRP’s trust and rely on 
IT vendors. This trust and reliance results in the IRP having confidence in their security 
program’s effectiveness. This further supports the IRP’s confidence in their program because 
they are actively engaged to ensure the organization is as secure as possible, which they perceive 
as a truth. The IRP sees the scope of the IT vendor’s work to include security activities. This is 
resultant from technical security controls being implemented by the IT vendor and being 
interpreted by the IRP as the scope of required security controls to “be secure”.  
IRP’s perception of what represents security for their organization is often perceived as 
privacy controls and security controls that protect the confidentiality of patient information. This 
is reinforced via prominent news stories of healthcare-related data breaches resulting in financial 
penalties to healthcare organizations and experienced incidents of privacy breaches for IRPs. 
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The scope of the IT vendors statement of work for participant organizations is perceived 
to include security by the IRP. Furthermore, perception of security to the IRP is seen as controls 
that mitigate risks that threaten confidentiality. Thus, security control selection implemented at 
the organization is influenced to address breach of confidentiality and seen as an IT matter.  
The security control selection, the narrow perception of what security means to the IRP, 
the assumption of security being addressed by the IT vendor, and the confidence the IRP holds in 
the SHPO’s security program explains the IRP’s perception of risk exposure being misaligned 
with the organization’s real risk. This misalignment answers why SPHOs do not have very 
effective information security controls despite internal and external factors.  
Discussion 
This research set out to understand why information security at SHPO is not very 
effective despite internal and external factors promoting the opposite. This area of research is 
limited, with very little literature looking at information security for these business types. 
Therefore, it made logical sense to utilize a qualitative research methodology to explore this 
space and understand the dimensions of the problem and develop a theory to explain what is 
actually occurring to create this phenomenon. 
The purpose of this section is to provide the researcher’s interpretation of the findings. 
These interpretations are informed by the findings themselves, the complete interview experience 
the researcher had with each participant, the researcher’s own world views and professional 
experience, and the current literature.  
Nearly all participants acknowledged their limited knowledge of IT. Finding 1 includes 
both IT and information security as the limited knowledge area, but most participants were 
unable to distinguish between the two topics with any level of accuracy.  
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IRPs are responsible for several facets of the business operations including technology. 
Kruse et al. (Kruse et al., 2017) show the healthcare industry struggles with new technology. The 
voiced frustration by some participants indicated technology was a losing proposition to stay 
knowledgeable on: “cyber changes and evolves so much faster than anything else that it’s 
difficult to keep up with that” (PR7). IRPs want technology to support the organization's mission 
and they “don’t want to be thinking about technology” (PR12). Implementing security is 
inclusive this delegation. Therefore, they not need to be IT or information security 
knowledgeable. 
An interesting and unexpected observation was the increase of information security 
knowledge for the participant simply from participating in this research study. Multiple 
participants commented at the end of the interview on their level of attention they have given 
toward information security at their organization and their heightened awareness to remedy that 
going forward. This may result in increased cyber security activities. However, Johnson and 
Koch’s (Johnson & Koch, 2006) survey-based research showed (industry-agnostic) small 
businesses, will not take action to remediate information security risk if made aware of it. 
An ancillary observation noted four research candidates that chose not to participate. This 
is within their rights as candidates, but the manner in which they chose to not participate was 
interesting. All four candidates engaged in positive communication regarding the research study 
and their desire to participate. Two of the candidates, PR13 and PR15, ceased communication 
altogether when it reached the stage of scheduling an interview. Two of the candidates, PR4 and 
PR11, scheduled interviews with the PI, but did not show up for the interview. All four 
participants never responded to any further communication from the PI which included two 
communications regarding scheduling (PR13, PR15) and two communications regarding failure 
to attend the agreed upon meeting time for the interview (PR4, PR11).  
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The demographic of these four organizations are similar to the nine participants in this 
study. Many other participants found speaking with the PI during the interview increased their 
awareness of information security. There is not enough data and it was not the objective of this 
research study to determine why these participants ceased communication and did not 
participate.  
The basis of participants knowledge of information security was the perceived 
interpretation of HIPAA, real-life cyber incident experience, cyber incidents in the news, or 
stories from colleagues. This knowledge was often related to a confidentiality compromise such 
as stolen work papers from a car or snooping on a patient record without just cause. This 
reinforced the findings of limited knowledge in the space and the emphasis and nearly singular 
objective focus of security control selection to ensure confidentiality.  
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995) identify the three 
factors of trustworthiness as ability, benevolence, and integrity. Participants were very trusting of 
their IT vendors. The IT vendors had significant privileged access to the participants 
organizational information assets and business operations, but not once did a participant mention 
any concern about their IT vendor from an organizational risk perspective.  
The limited knowledge participants have in IT and information security increases their 
assigned value of ability of their IT vendor. Increasing the ability value therefore increases the 
trustworthiness of the vendor to the participant.  
Many participants related the quality and reliability of their IT vendor to the timeliness, 
accessibility, and the stability of the organizations IT. When asked if information security was a 
factor in selecting their IT vendor, PR6 said: “Well I mean just their experience with them being 
timely being a good firm being up to date on current practices that are best practices all of these 
are factors in our decision to choose them as our IT firm.” (PR6). Therefore, an IT vendor is 
EXPLORING HEALTHCARE PROVIDER INFORMATION SECURITY 
 84 
reliable if they ensure the organizations computers are fixed in a timely manner if they break and 
that they can be reached easily if needed. This is equated with IT vendor competence. Per Mayer 
et al. (Mayer et al., 1995) work this IT competency establishes trustworthiness.  
Information security implementation is being seen as an IT exclusive issue by the IRP, 
despite the participants referencing non-IT related controls such as training and awareness for 
staff on secure practices and policy development. When PR14 was asked what information 
security responsibilities he had, his response was “We have a cyber person” (PR14), referring to 
the organization’s IT vendor. 
As previously discussed, limited knowledge of IRPs coupled with the assumption that IT 
vendors are information security experts corroborates SPHOs view security is inherently 
achieved through IT management, and the responsibility of the IT vendor. The two Venn 
diagrams below illustrate perception and reality: 
 
Figure 4 - Perception: Information security position within an organization 
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Figure 5 - Reality: Information security position within an organization 
 
Bagwell (Bagwell, 2016) showed small businesses are resource-constrained and do not 
have the opportunity to dedicate resources to programmatic information security to protect their 
data and assets, therefore IRPs may see the IT vendor providing information security as a cost-
savings and the ability to be proactive about security in the face of resource scarcity. 
HIPAA is often discussed in the context of a privacy breach. HHS’ OCR maintains a 
public website of all healthcare industry related privacy breaches over 500 records, a so-called 
'wall of shame'. The concept of not sharing personal information with unauthorized individuals is 
very easy to comprehend. Multiple participants cited related examples when discussing their 
organizations own security controls. The following exchange highlights the unconscious 
association with how security and security effectiveness is perceived:  
Interviewer: For the security controls you guys do have in place how effective 
would you say they are? (PI)  
PR6: I hope I'm not jinxing myself, but I think they're very effective we haven't 
had any type of breach or hack (PR6) 
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This coupled with the IRPs limited information security knowledge to be aware of the 
threat landscape suggests they see protecting the confidentiality of patient information as the 
focus of the HIPAA and their own security program. 
Many participants shared their organization had never had a security incident. This 
indicates a conflict with Hoffman (2015) who published 90% of healthcare providers have 
suffered a data breach between 2012-2014. This conflict may be in the way participants viewed 
security incidents. One exchange highlighted this as PR8 shared his organization has never had a 
breach, but then quickly qualified it:  
Interviewer: How effective do you think your security controls are? (PI) 
PR8: I think they’re 100% effective. (PR8) 
Interviewer: Okay. (PI) 
PR8: Never had a breach. (PR8) 
Interviewer: Okay. (PI) 
PR8: Never had a breach—a reported breach. (PR8) 
Participant organizations are willing to invest in security and introduce controls to be 
compliant or “do whatever it takes to make sure we're secure” (PR6). Multiple participants noted 
cost was a factor in making information security decisions but would be willing to spend what it 
takes to be reasonably secure. Highlighted by the “flashlight in a dark room” metaphor, the areas 
of risk and the threats the participants are aware of have controls implemented to mitigate the 
risk to perceived acceptable levels. Finding 1 that pointed out that limited knowledge of IT and 
information security misleads IRP’s confidence in their program because for the limited 
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knowledge of risks and controls they are aware of; the IRP’s are addressing them. This suggests 
how they have confidence in their security posture.  
A recurring concept heard from multiple participants was the need to outsource IT 
because of its criticality to the business and the ability for it to be wholly delegated.  Participants 
ranged from business managers, practice administrators, C-level personnel, and managing 
directors. All participants had responsibilities to their organization that included a diverse range. 
One participant shared “I handle a lot of different areas it’s hard to be an expert in every single 
area” (PR7).  
An overwhelming majority of participants (7/9 or 78%) were not implementing a risk-
based security assessment to inform what controls they should be implementing and the risk 
reduction value. Technical controls appeared selected based solely on IT vendor 
recommendation. 
Two of the participants had transcended from this risk exposure reality and perception 
misalignment through execution of a security risk assessment activity. This activity informs on 
risks to the SHPO from relevant threats and security controls to reduce those risks. This activity 
affects the participants limited IT and information security knowledge and resulted in the 
implementation of a risk-based security program that is continually monitored and evaluated. 
Conclusion 
SHPO are interested in being secure and protecting patient information appropriately. 
The foundational issue with these organizations’ approach to information security is the coupling 
of two issues. First the narrow scope the IRP’s identify as the composition of information 
security. Secondly the SHPO’s assumption of outsourcing information security by outsourcing of 
IT services. 
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The “flashlight in a dark room” theory was presented to metaphorically explain the 
phenomenon.  Six key findings were presented that were inductively discovered through 
grounded theory techniques and theoretically saturated from research participants. 
A discussion of the findings and their potential implications was provided to help shape 
the impact and results of these findings. 
The following chapter provides the conclusion to the research dissertation. Each finding 
and the theory itself have warranted conclusions that are logical and clearly explained. Doable 
and actionable recommendations for SHPOs are provided to address the discovered barriers. 
Limitations to the research study are provided. Finally, recommendations for future research are 
suggested. 





This research effort has explored information security practices of small healthcare 
practices. This area of research is very limited, and this study’s intent was to qualitatively 
understand how information security is perceived and approached through the experiences of the 
responsible individuals operating in this space. Intensive interviewing techniques, informing a 
grounded theory methodology, fostered the development of a theory explaining how information 
security is implemented, operated and maintained at these organizations.  
This chapter presents conclusions based on the findings and analysis presented in Chapter 
4. Recommendations for both policy development and practical actions for these organizations 
are provided. Several areas of future research are suggested. Limitations to the research are 
presented to assist in validity and bounding the theory. Finally, given this research was an 
eighteen-month effort, researcher reflections on the study and its findings are presented. 
Conclusions 
Responsibility for a function with limited knowledge. The first finding of this research 
is the limited knowledge in IT and information security that the responsible individual in the 
practices possesses. These individuals’ knowledge base is primarily clinical and business 
operations. 
SHPOs should expect IRPs to become knowledgeable in IT and information security, at 
minimum from an awareness perspective. Assigning responsibility of a business area to an 
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individual with no knowledge in the area is risky; businesses might not choose to do this if they 
knew the scope of information security and associated risks. Meanwhile, the IRPs acknowledged 
their limited knowledge, but were generally uninterested in learning more about information 
security.  
Nevertheless, IRPs must increase their knowledge of IT and information security to better 
inform the organization across all facets of the information security space. Increasing knowledge 
expands the concept of security objectives, affects security control selection, and allows the IRP 
to properly understand the role their IT vendor is providing from an information security 
perspective and where gaps exist. 
IT expertise and information security expertise are not equivalent. The second 
finding is that SHPOs trust and rely on their IT vendors to have IT knowledge and expertise, and 
because IRPs associate information security with IT, they assume IT vendors are information 
security experts. 
Many security controls are associated with architecting and configuring IT in a secure 
manner. This may suggest why IRPs mistakenly assume IT vendors provide for the information 
security needs of their organization. 
IRP's should expect IT vendors to be knowledgeable on IT with respect to functionality 
that provides some information security capabilities, but should not assume the IT vendors are 
otherwise information security knowledgeable. For example, an IT vendor should know how to 
configure a firewall (a network device for controlling data flow into and out of an organizations 
IT infrastructure), but it must not be assumed the vendor knows how to configure a firewall 
securely.  
Perceptions that IT vendor contracts cover information security. The third finding is 
that SHPOs assume IT vendors provide comprehensive information security as part of their 
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service offering. IT vendors will unavoidably be engaged in implementation of some security 
controls for an organization, such as configuring computers to require a username and password 
for login. This does not mean the security controls are comprehensive, appropriate, or even 
adding significant risk-reducing value. 
IRPs should view information security and IT as separate business aspects. Information 
security should help inform IT on how to configure security features in technology and to what 
extent of security to implement. Information security does have entanglements with IT but is not 
exclusively IT. 
Understanding the scope of information security. The fourth finding is the concept 
that IRPs are thinking of information security with the lens of only one security objective - 
confidentiality, in compliance with the HIPAA privacy-related regulation. 
IRP's must not view information security as a privacy activity.  They must understand 
that the scope of information security includes availability, integrity and confidentiality 
objectives as reported by Whitman and Mattord (Whitman & Mattord, 2011). Expanding 
awareness will inform the IRPs about what threats and risks exist and what controls can be 
implemented to address them. 
Desire to implement appropriate security. The fifth finding is the confidence in the 
effectiveness of participants currently constituted information security programs, and their drive 
to invest and add controls to reduce any identified risk to acceptable levels. Therefore, the key is 
to identify the very real risks. 
IRPs may be willing to secure their organization if they were aware of evident threats and 
risks. Indeed, even a brief phone interview about information security, or discussions within 
professional organizations, might be the catalyst for a deeper threat assessment.  Such an activity 
would metaphorically be "turning on the light switch" in the dark room of risk the IRP is looking 
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at with a flashlight. This conclusion does conflict with Johnson and Koch’s (2006) research that 
suggests if a small business owner knows about a security risk, they are not willing to take action 
to defend or pay for protection; however, their research was for home-based small businesses 
and was not focused on healthcare operations.    
Outsourcing services will continue. Finally, the sixth finding is the consistency with 
which SHPOs outsource IT and nominally information security. In fact, they are generally not 
really outsourcing information security, but believe they are through the IT vendor outsourcing 
services.  
SHPOs should identify that IT and information security are separate business aspects and 
outsource appropriately. Some IT vendors do provide in-depth information security services as 
an additional service, but SHPOs must understand when this is additional, and be certain that 
contract language is clear and meets the SHPO’s information security needs.   
Regardless of any outsourcing of information security services, SHPOs must ensure they 
address information security as a critical business function, that includes certain elements (e.g. 
operational controls) that must be practice-implemented and enforced. Otherwise, IT operations 
will continue to have potentially significant, unaccounted, and implicitly-accepted risk. 
Recommendations 
The following recommendations are based on the findings, analysis and conclusions 
presented in this dissertation. They are presented for two perspectives: policy and practice. 
Policy is to inform the industry and legislators on making macro changes that may improve the 
information security effectiveness for SHPOs. Practice recommendations are intended for 
SHPOs to implement to align risk perception and reality, thus allowing them to have visibility 
into their organization’s information security risk profile. 
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Policy. Education materials related to implementing appropriate information security at 
small healthcare practices and designed for audiences with limited IT and information security 
knowledge should be developed to effectively communicate ways to implement information 
security. Efforts in early 2019 are already being seen to implement this recommendation. Chua et 
al. (Chua, 2018) through the Healthcare & Public Health Sector Coordinating Councils produced 
the "Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices: Managing Threats and Protecting Patients" report 
that provides more accessible language and guidance from previous healthcare industry 
information security guidance. 
Currently the HHS’ OCR is tasked with ensuring compliance with both the HIPAA 
privacy and security rules. This Office audits for compliance and has levied severe monetary 
penalties (HHS.gov, 2018c). OCR’s guidelines for small healthcare practices are vague in this 
researcher’s opinion; OCR should provide clear expectations for compliance with the HIPAA 
security rule for SHPOs. 
Currently OCR has two events that initiate an audit of a SHPO (HHS.gov, 2017a). One is 
a submission of a SHPO HIPAA non-compliance event to HHS’ OCR. The other is a proactive 
audit conducted by the OCR. The most recent phased activity audit occurred in 2016 and audited 
less than eight-tenths of 1 percent of healthcare providers in the United States. Reference 
Appendix E for details on how this value was determined. This indicates that SHPOs that are not 
involved in a submission and are not involved in the OCR audit have no event that would initiate 
a review of security control selection with respect to HIPAA requirements. HHS could 
investigate policy to require healthcare providers to annually submit attestations of foundational 
security control implementation through a standardized method. This same approach of reporting 
is implemented for federal agencies annually reporting on Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) compliance, a security and privacy standard comparable to HIPAA, 
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to the Office of Management and Budget as required by law (Congress.gov, 2014). This would 
provide HHS with data points to support rapid audits in the future and provide SHPOs with 
awareness to the scope of information security controls to consider at their organization, thus 
addressing the limited IT and information knowledge finding. 
Practice. SHPO should seek explicit information security outsourced services to ensure 
appropriate information security is implemented at the organization, thus assessing actual 
organizational cyber risk.  
A risk-based security program should be adopted to promote purposeful, value-add 
security control selection for organizations. This will also allow organizations to be aware of 
their current risks, prioritize risk remediation, and mature their information security program. 
This recommendation is further supported by an initial observation from 2/9 of the SHPOs in the 
research study. These two organizations had implemented a risk-based security program and 
were informed by this approach on the larger scope of information security needs at their 
organization. 
Healthcare organizations should engage their medical malpractice insurance carriers to 
determine the availably of cyber insurance riders. Two participants mentioned their malpractice 
provider offered this, but had not added it to their policy. 
Limitations 
Chapman, Hadfield, and Chapman (Chapman, Hadfield, & Chapman, 2015) point out a 
demographic-related limitation with qualitative research that applies in this study. The 
demographic for the research population was constrained to SHPOs with fewer than ten 
providers in the state of South Carolina, and may not apply to larger practices, or those in other 
regions or states.  In addition, the urban/rural distribution of this research sample may not be 
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otherwise applicable.  Five participating SHPOs were from the Charleston, SC area.   While the 
specialties of participating SHPOs were diverse (dermatology, pain management, neurology and 
general practice), many other specialties were not represented; this is also a constraint of the 
population demographic. Finally, all participating SHPOs were medical/surgical practices. This 
excluded other healthcare provider types, including but not limited to psychotherapy, dental, 
alternative, and tribal.  
Sikolia et al. (Sikolia et al., 2013) identifies three techniques to promote interpretive 
validity of qualitative research. These are participants reviewing and verifying the transcriptions 
of their interview, participants guiding the direction of the interview, and using participants 
language and responses in the emerging theory. Research participants limited their ability to 
commit to participation outside the interview activity. Therefore, participant verification of 
transcriptions was impossible, a potential research limitation. 
The IRB prohibited in-person interviews. All IRPs were interviewed over the phone 
(audio only, recorded).  This prevented any ability to record and analyze physical or non-audio 
behavior. Such observations are elemental to Maxwell’s (Maxwell, 1992) descriptive validity, 
and their recording and analysis were part of this study’s original methods, but could not be 
done. 
Per Price and Murnan (Price & Murnan, 2004), another threat to the internal validity of a 
study occurs when respondents do not respond truthfully to items on an instrument. However, 
efforts were taken to encourage participant truthfulness in this research, as documented in 
chapter 3.  Indeed, this researcher believes that the research participants were honest and truthful 
in their interviews; their responses were certainly “internally consistent.”  Moreover, it may be 
that the four “drop-out” IRPs did so because they were troubled about the “truths” they would 
otherwise share about their SHPO. In any case, this must be included as a potential limitation of 
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the study, that might be mitigated in future research by some external validation of IRP 
responses. 
Another limitation was the participant population size. Nine participant organizations 
were included in this study. Creswell (2014) suggests 20 participants for a grounded theory study 
and Charmaz (2006) suggests 25.  Charmaz does state in an interview that Glaser, one of the 
originators of grounded theory, suggested grounded theory could be done with as little as 3 
interviews (Gibbs, 2015). This limitation was addressed by adhering to grounded theory methods 
to achieve theoretical saturation for the developed theory. 
Future Research 
This research study was exploratory to help cast a light on a specific area of study with 
minimal literature. Although it was able to answer the question of why SHPOs struggle with 
information security. The following future research ideas will help inform on this theory’s 
applicability, investigate practices that may address the issues this study introduces, and provide 
inputs to policy makers. 
IT vendor information security knowledge and implemented security controls. There 
were some identified technical security controls implemented by IT vendors at the SHPOs. 
Research focused on the knowledge of and actual security controls implemented by the IT 
vendors could reveal the areas of risk that are commonly addressed by these organizations. This 
could identify common explicit information security gaps at the SHPOs. 
Same study, different state(s). This study was constrained to the state of South Carolina. 
State specific regulations did not have material effect on the research participants. Participants 
referenced federal regulations and did not mention state regulations when discussing information 
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security regulations affecting their decisions and businesses. These findings may or may not be 
generalizable to the small healthcare practices in all states.  
Same state, controlled demographics. This study did not discriminate on demographics 
for the participant organizations. Healthcare providers in rural, suburban, and urban areas may 
have different priorities, information security attitudes, or resources. Introducing a constraint on 
the participant demographic may lead to insights into subtle differences or needs for specific 
healthcare organization types. This can inform policy makers and information security 
responsible individuals to design and execute tailored reform. 
Measure the degree of limited knowledge in IT/ information security. The finding of 
limited IT and information security knowledge for IRPs was a material finding that underpinned 
the overall theory. There was no investigation or analysis of the level of their knowledge. A 
validated instrument to measure the level of knowledge for these IRPs in IT and information 
security would be appropriate to better understand what “limited” means in this context.  
Evaluate IT vendor contracts to assess security language. Another finding of this 
research was the assumption IRPs make about the scope of work their IT vendors are responsible 
for executing. The inclusion of information security in this responsibility was sometimes 
mentioned in the contract, per the participants. An evaluation of contract language of IT vendors 
that provide IT services to healthcare providers to determine if information security is included, 
and to what degree.  
Researcher reflections 
Education is for improving the lives of others and for leaving your community and world better 
than what you found it. 
-Marian Wright Edelman, The Measure of Our Success, 1992 
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This doctoral program was entered with the intention of making an information security 
related contribution to small businesses. These business types are often marginalized when it 
comes to research, best practices, and resources compared to their enterprise-sized counterparts. I 
had no idea when I started this journey the direction it would take. Focusing on healthcare is 
satisfying because it is an industry that lags among others for information security practices, has 
a complicated struggle between timely information for clinical decisions and availability, 
integrity and confidentiality considerations.  
Many of the assumptions made at the onset of this research were proven wrong. I am 
optimistic that the general attitude and passion the participants I spoke with implies that once 
they ‘turn on the light’ they will improve their organizations overall information security. While 
an optimistic notion, perhaps even brief IRP interviews about their practice’s information 
security could be the spark that could start a fire of improving small business healthcare 
information security in a meaningful way. 
I was pleasantly surprised with the interest that participants had in speaking with me 
about information security at their practice. I found them rather forthcoming.  Moreover, it 
appeared that the interviews led to their increased perception of value in knowing more about 
information security. Indeed, despite their “status quo” outsourcing of information security to 
their IT vendors, many participants expressed interest in reading this dissertation upon 
publication to gain further understanding of how information security is being addressed in their 
demographics.  
I hope this effort serves this community and provides a foundation for future research to 
be performed given this research’s exploratory nature. 
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS 
The following terms are used throughout this report. Their definitions are provided and 
sourced. Appropriate definitions have been selected from healthcare and cybersecurity literature 
and regulations to align to the research and literature contained within this document. 
 
Breach  
(A) IN GENERAL. The term ‘breach’ means the unauthorized acquisition, access, use, or 
disclosure of protected health information which compromises the security or privacy of such 
information, except where an unauthorized person to whom such information is disclosed would 
not reasonably have been able to retain such information. 
(B) EXCEPTIONS. The term ‘breach’ does not include— 
(i) Any unintentional acquisition, access, or use of protected health information by an employee 
or individual acting under the authority of a covered entity or business associate if— 
(1) Such acquisition, access, or use was made in good faith and within the course and scope of 
the employment or other professional relationship of such employee or individual, respectively, 
with the covered entity or business associate; and 
(2) Such information is not further acquired, accessed, used, or disclosed by any person; 
(ii) Any inadvertent disclosure from an individual who is otherwise authorized to access 
protected health information at a facility operated by a covered entity or business associate to 
another similarly situated individual at same facility; and 
(iii) Any such information received as a result of such disclosure is not further acquired, 
accessed, used, or disclosed without authorization by any person. ("HITECH Act," 2009) 
Business Associate 
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Business associate: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this definition, business 
associate means, with respect to a covered entity, a person who: (i) On behalf of such covered 
entity or of an organized health care arrangement (as defined in this section) in which the 
covered entity participates, but other than in the capacity of a member of the workforce of such 
covered entity or arrangement, creates, receives, maintains, or transmits protected health 
information for a function or activity regulated by this subchapter, including claims processing or 
administration, data analysis, processing or administration, utilization review, quality assurance, 
patient safety activities listed at 42 CFR 3.20, billing, benefit management, practice 
management, and repricing; or (ii) Provides, other than in the capacity of a member of the 
workforce of such covered entity, legal, actuarial, accounting, consulting, data aggregation (as 
defined in §164.501 of this subchapter), management, administrative, accreditation, or financial 
services to or for such covered entity, or to or for an organized health care arrangement in which 
the covered entity participates, where the provision of the service involves the disclosure of 
protected health information from such covered entity or arrangement, or from another business 
associate of such covered entity or arrangement, to the person. ("Section 160.103. Definitions," 
2013) 
Covered Entity 
Covered entity means: (1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A health 
care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a 
transaction covered by this subchapter.  ("Section 160.103. Definitions," 2013) 
Disclosure  
The release, transfer, provision of access to, or divulging in any manner of information 
outside the entity holding the information.("Section 160.103. Definitions," 2013) 
Electronic Health Record  
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The term ‘‘electronic health record’’ means an electronic record of health-related 
information on an individual that is created, gathered, managed, and consulted by authorized 
health care clinicians and staff. ("HITECH Act," 2009) 
Healthcare Operations  
Health care operations means any of the following activities of the covered entity to the 
extent that the activities are related to covered functions: (1) Conducting quality assessment and 
improvement activities, including outcomes evaluation and development of clinical guidelines, 
provided that the obtaining of generalizable knowledge is not the primary purpose of any studies 
resulting from such activities; population-based activities relating to improving health or 
reducing health care costs, protocol development, case management and care coordination, 
contacting of health care providers and patients with information about treatment alternatives; 
and related functions that do not include treatment; (2) Reviewing the competence or 
qualifications of health care professionals, evaluating practitioner and provider performance, 
health plan performance, conducting training programs in which students, trainees, or 
practitioners in areas of health care learn under supervision to practice or improve their skills as 
health care providers, training of non-health care professionals, accreditation, certification, 
licensing, or credentialing activities; (3) Underwriting, premium rating, and other activities 
relating to the creation, renewal or replacement of a contract of health insurance or health 
benefits, and ceding, securing, or placing a contract for reinsurance of risk relating to claims for 
health care (including stop-loss insurance and excess of loss insurance), provided that the 
requirements of §164.514(g) are met, if applicable; (4) Conducting or arranging for medical 
review, legal services, and auditing functions, including fraud and abuse detection and 
compliance programs; (5) Business planning and development, such as conducting cost-
management and planning-related analyses related to managing and operating the entity, 
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including formulary development and administration, development or improvement of methods 
of payment or coverage policies; and (6) Business management and general administrative 
activities of the entity, including, but not limited to: (i) Management activities relating to 
implementation of and compliance with the requirements of this subchapter; (ii) Customer 
service, including the provision of data analyses for policy holders, plan sponsors, or other 
customers, provided that protected health information is not disclosed to such policy holder, plan 
sponsor, or customer. (iii) Resolution of internal grievances; (iv) The sale, transfer, merger, or 
consolidation of all or part of the covered entity with another covered entity, or an entity that 
following such activity will become a covered entity and due diligence related to such activity; 
and (v) Consistent with the applicable requirements of §164.514, creating deidentified health 
information or a limited data set, and fundraising for the benefit of the covered entity.("45 CFR § 
164.501 - Definitions.," 2004) 
Protected Health Information 
Individually identifiable health information: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of 
this definition, that is: (i) Transmitted by electronic media; (ii) Maintained in electronic media; 
or (iii) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or medium. (2) Protected health information 
excludes individually identifiable health information: (i) In education records covered by the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1232g; (ii) In records 
described at 20 U.S.C. 1232g(a)(4)(B)(iv); (iii) In employment records held by a covered entity 
in its role as employer; (iv) Regarding a person who has been deceased for more than 50 years. 
("HITECH Act," 2009) 
Individually identifiable health information 
Individually identifiable health information is information that is a subset of health 
information, including demographic information collected from an individual, and: (1) Is created 
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or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health care clearinghouse; and (2) 
Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an individual; the 
provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision 
of health care to an individual; and (i) That identifies the individual; or (ii) With respect to which 
there is a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual. 
("HITECH Act," 2009) 
Security or Security Measures  
All of the administrative, physical, and technical safeguards in an information system. ("§ 
164.304 Definitions.," 2011) 
Health care Provider 
The term ‘health care provider’ includes a hospital, skilled nursing facility, nursing 
facility, home health entity or other long term care facility, health care clinic, community mental 
health center (as defined in section 1913(b)(1)), renal dialysis facility, blood center, ambulatory 
surgical center described in section 1833(i) of the Social Security Act, emergency medical 
services provider, Federally qualified health center, group practice, a pharmacist, a pharmacy, a 
laboratory, a physician (as defined in section 1861(r) of the Social Security Act), a practitioner 
(as described in section 1842(b)(18)(C) of the Social Security Act), a provider operated by, or 
under contract with, the Indian Health Service or by an Indian tribe (as defined in the Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act), tribal organization, or urban Indian 
organization (as defined in section 4 of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act), a rural health 
clinic, a covered entity under section 340B, an ambulatory surgical center described in section 
1833(i) of the Social Security Act, a therapist (as defined in section 1848(k)(3)(B)(iii) of the 
Social Security Act), and any other category of health care facility, entity, practitioner, or 
clinician determined appropriate by the Secretary.("HITECH Act," 2009) 
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Threat  
Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational 
operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, 
individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized 
access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service. (Kissel, 
2013) 
Information Security 
The protection of information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability.(Kissel, 2013) 
Incident 
A violation or imminent threat of violation of computer security policies, acceptable use 
policies, or standard security practices. (Kissel, 2013) 
Vulnerability 
Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or 
implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source. (Kissel, 2013) 
Cyber Attack 
An attack, via cyberspace, targeting an enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of 
disrupting, disabling, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computing 
environment/infrastructure; or destroying the integrity of the data or stealing controlled 
information.  (Kissel, 2013) 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
This document provides guidance on the agenda used to facilitate interviews for research 
associated with South Carolina, Small Healthcare Provider Organization Cybersecurity Program 
Decision Processes. Structure of interview and nature of question is based on Charmaz 2006, 
“Constructing Grounded Theory” (Charmaz, 2006). The following preamble is spoken by the 
researcher to the participant prior to asking any questions. 
Preamble  
Each interview will begin with my preamble to introduce myself, establish purpose of the 
interview and affirm confidentiality. The preamble is: 
Thank you for your time and speaking with me. I am a doctoral candidate. I 
currently work at the Medical University of South Carolina, researching small 
business healthcare cybersecurity decision processes. I would like to talk in 
generalities to get an understanding of the types of security issues you may 
face. I do not want to know explicitly if your company has had a successful 
breach or experienced a successful cyber-attack. 
The information provided will remain strictly confidential and you will 
not be identified by your answers. You and your company’s name will not be 
disclosed in any way. Data will be compiled with no individual responses tied 
to your name or any identifying information about you. I would like to record 
this interview. All information disclosed during our conversation will be kept 
in a secure location. You may choose not to answer any question. Do you have 
any questions before we get started? Are you willing to participate? 
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I will begin recording this interview session now. 
Ice Breaker Questions 
1. Please tell me about yourself and how long you have worked at [company] 
2. How did you come to be involved in information security at [company] 
3. Please describe the organization structure at [company].  
4. Please describe your cyber security related responsibilities at [company].  
Information Security Program Questions 
1. Describe the process and procedures related to cyber security at [company] 
2. Describe the culture or attitude relative to security and privacy? 
3. What is the overall approach for cyber risk management?  
4. Describe how decisions related to cyber security are made? For example, HIPAA 
regulations come out or the decision to invest in some type of security related technology 
(cyber insurance, anti-virus software, etc). 
5. Can you describe your beliefs toward healthcare cybersecurity regulation? 
6. Can you describe your thoughts on cyber security as a responsibility at [company]? 
7. When working with vendors (i.e. cloud solutions), how does cyber security factor into the 
discussion and evaluation?  
8. Without detail of an actual experienced cyber related attack, How has any experienced 
cyber security related events such as a virus-infected computer, a stolen laptop with 
patient data, or faxing to a wrong number, affected change at [company]? 
9. How has your information security budget been changing over the past couple of years? 
10. Describe your primary concerns from a cyber security standpoint? 
11. What do you see as the biggest cyber threats for companies like yours? 
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12. How do you identify which threats are most important and prioritize accordingly? 
13. How effective are your security controls? How do you know this? 
14. Describe how end user experience factors into cybersecurity decisions?  
15. What factor is most important in driving cybersecurity investment: cost reduction, 
compliance obligations, perceived risk reduction, general process improvement, or 
something else? Please elaborate. 
16. Are you involved with information security related budgeting decisions? When 
evaluating about information security spending decisions, describe the process for 
making those decisions, including if evidence or metrics used in making cyber 
investment decisions. 
17. Describe your thoughts on the information you have and use in managing overall cyber 
risk and prioritizing accordingly? 
18. Describe your thoughts on how cybersecurity is supported and decided here? 
19. Can you describe how cybersecurity and the decisions made about cybersecurity have 
changed over time? 
20. What outside organizations have helped you in making cybersecurity decisions? 
a. How did they get involved with your organization (sought out, vendor sales, post 
breach, insurance provider, conference)? 
Ending Questions  
1. What do you think are the most important ways to make cybersecurity decisions for small 
healthcare businesses?  
2. Is there anything else you think I should know to understand how cybersecurity is 
managed and how decisions about it are made at your organization? 
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3. Is there anything that you might not have thought about before that occurred to you 
during this interview? 
4. Is there anything you’d like to ask me? 
Interview Probes to Clarify and Elicit More Information  
1. Could you clarify what you meant about ____?  
2. How does ____ relate to ___?  
3. How often does ____happen?   
4. Where?   
5. When?   
6. Who is involved?  
7. Is that always the same situation or have you ever experienced it to be different?  
8. Was that the unusual?   
9. Was that exceptional? 
10. That’s something I haven’t heard before, could you explain more about _______?  
11. Do you know other people who may experience that from a different perspective?  
12. How did you come to know this?  
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APPENDIX C: IRB APPROVAL 
APPROVAL:         
This is to certify that the research proposal Pro00079974 entitled: 
South Carolina, Small Healthcare Provider Cybersecurity Program Decision Processing:  
A Grounded Theory Study 
and submitted by:  Gerald Auger 
Department: Medical University of South Carolina  
For consideration has been reviewed by IRB-II - Medical University of South Carolina and 
approved with respect to the study of human subjects as adequately protecting the rights and 
welfare of the individuals involved, employing adequately methods of securing informed consent 
from these individuals and not involving undue risk in the light of potential benefits to be derived 
therefrom. Additionally, the Institutional Review Board for Human Research (IRB) recommends 
approval of the investigator's request for Waiver of Signed Consent in accordance with 45 CFR 
46.117(c)(1),(2) because the only record linking the subject and the research would be the 
consent document and the principal risk would be potential harm resulting from a breach of 
confidentiality and/or because the research presents no more than minimal risk and involves no 
procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research context.. No 
IRB member who has a conflicting interest was involved in the review or approval of this study, 
except to provide information as requested by the IRB.  
Original Approval Date: 7/19/2018 
Approval Expiration: 7/18/2019 
Type: Expedited 
Chairman, IRB-II - Medical University of South Carolina 
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Susan Sonne, PharmD* 
Statement of Principal Investigator: 
As previously signed and certified, I understand that approval of this research involving human 
subjects is contingent upon my agreement: 
1. To report to the Institutional Review Board for Human Research (IRB) any adverse events 
or research related injuries which might occur in relation to the human research.  I have 
read and will comply with IRB reporting requirements for adverse events. 
2. To submit in writing for prior IRB approval any alterations to the plan of human research. 
3. To submit timely continuing review reports of this research as requested by the IRB. 
4. To maintain copies of all pertinent information related to the research activities in this 
project, including copies of informed consent agreements obtained from all participants. 
5. To notify the IRB immediately upon the termination of this project, and/or the departure 
of the principal investigator from this Institution and the project. 
* Electronic Signature: This document has been electronically signed by the IRB Chairman 
through the HSSC eIRB Submission System authorizing IRB approval for this study as described 
in this letter. 
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APPENDIX D: CODING AND CATEGORIES 
Table 5 - Coding inventory 
Index Name 
1 Trust IT vendor with Security 
2 Trust IT vendor with Security (NOT) 
3 Reliant on Vendor 
4 Reliant on Vendor (NOT) 
5 above and beyond HIPAA 
6 accepting and supportive of HIPAA 
7 accepting certification as secure 
8 Access controls 
9 adopting EMR relative to compliance 
10 
adopting EMR relative 
to financial 
motivations 
11 adopting technology slowly 
12 
assessing end user 
population as very 
careful 
13 assessing paper records as low value asset 
14 assuming no breach 
15 
availability as a 
security objective in 
practice 
16 be as secure as possible 
17 belief that security should be high quality 
18 believes no security incidents 
19 believing business is HIPAA compliant 
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Index Name 
20 breach of patient data is the impact 
21 budget increased by cyber security 




requirements for cyber 
insurance 
24 
challenging to keep up 
with protecting as 
technology evolves 
25 
cloud solutions more 
secure because 
absensce of physical 
threats 
26 collaborating with IT vendor on decisions 
27 concern of HIPAA violation 
28 concern of ownership of a breach 
29 concerned with record retention and disposal 
30 concerning about financial impacts 
31 
concerning about 











confidentiality as a 
security objective in 
practice 
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Index Name 
35 conflicting priorities at the business 
36 constraining challenges of small business 
37 controls are reactive in nature 
38 
coorelating restituion 




certainly worth it from 
a cost benefit ratio 
40 
deferring and 
accepting of vendor 
security standards 
41 discussing attempted breaches 
42 
dont take cyber 
security threats as 
serious until you've 
experienced it 
43 educating end users 
44 encrypting email 
45 
end user convenience 
is a factor in security 
decisions 
46 
end user convenience 
is not a factor in 
security decisions 
47 enforcing security program 
48 
equating moving to 
EMR with information 
security needs 
49 
equating size of staff 
with necessity of 
control scope 
50 
erring on caution when 
complying with 
HIPAA 
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Index Name 
51 executing DR/BCP scenarios 
52 factoring cost of cyber security decisions 
53 
factoring risk reduction 
in cyber security 
decisions 
54 Fearing lack of control for external threats 
55 functionality over securty 
56 
generational factors 
into secure use of 
technology 
57 hackers as a threat 
58 hardware as an asset 






I wouldn’t really be 
looking at other 
metrics or data, it 
would just be is this 
the right time to go 
ahead and start 
working on this 
insurance policy. 








to comply with 
legislation 




income to medical 
practices has gone 
down 
66 insider threat 
67 integrity as a security objective. 
68 interacting with IT for break/fix mostly 
69 IT and security vendor 
70 IT budget explicit contains security 
71 IT budget implicit contains security 
72 key quote 
73 
knowing area of 
weakness but not 
addressing 
74 
lack of compliance 
oversight leads to 
responsbile person's 
interpretation of whats 
best practice 
75 
lack of security 
compliance due to 
change resistance 
76 
lack of security 
compliance due to 
understanding 
77 low IT knowledge 
78 maintaining current systems 
79 
medications and 
writing prescriptions as 
an asset 
80 meh HIPAA 
81 money well spent 
82 
needing to have basic 
awareness and 
education on 
regulations and good 
understanding of 
information sharing 




not considering vendor 
security practices 
during selection 
84 patient care is impact 
85 patient quality of life is the impact 
86 patient trust impact 
87 patients information as an asset 














HIPAA due to lack of 
enforcement 
93 receiving regular update reporting 
94 reliant on experts 
95 
remote access security 
designed and 
implemented 
96 reputation as an asset 
97 review security 
98 risk-based security program 







making requires tech 
savvy person 
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Index Name 
102 security is taken seriously 
103 
security not a 
consideration for 
business until an issue 
(Reactive) 
104 security staff information as an asset 
105 
security too hard to 
keep up to date and be 
an expert on 
106 securty as a burden 
107 seeing ransomware as a threat 
108 
seeing security and 
privacy as different 
concepts 
109 seeing security as IT only 
110 
seeing size of practice 
as a benefit to low 
costing security (meh) 
111 seeking complete security 
112 
seeking security 
expertise for program 
maturity 
113 self aware of security knowledge gaps 
114 self aware of security program maturity level 
115 sensitive information destruction practice 
116 
small business has 
small footprint of 
patient information 
117 staff have too much on their plate for security 
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Index Name 
118 staff information as an asset 
119 staying engaged with security 
120 strong passwords 
121 
technology needed to 
be efficient and 
competitive 
122 texting PHI a concern 
123 thinking of security as privacy 
124 too small a business for more controls 
125 too small a business to be a target 
126 transferring perceived responsibility 
127 trusting vendor 
128 try to do what the best practices are 
129 validating security controls work 






view on cyber security 
hasnt changed over 
time because havent 
seen anything 
(reactive) 
133 we stay on the cutting edge of technology 
134 wishing for compliance oversight 
135 workforce security conscious 
136 working directly with IT company 
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Table 6 - Category inventory 
Index Category 
1 ASSETS 
2 Confidence in Security Program 
3 FINANCIAL RELATED 
4 Healthcare Cyber Regulation 
5 IMPACTS 
6 Knowing but not Doing 
7 Negative Security 
8 OUTLIER CODES 
9 Privacy as the full scope of Security 





from lessons learned 
12 
REACTIVE 
SECURITY - Seeing 
no reason to change 
current security 
13 THREATS - External threats 
14 THREATS - Internal threats 
15 Vendor Trust - Blind Trust 
16 
Vendor Trust - Explicit 
Functionality, 
Assumed Security 
17 Vendor Trust - Reliance 
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APPENDIX E: CALCULATING HHS AUDIT SCOPE 
Table 7- Calculating HHS OCR phase 2 audit scope 
765,117 Number of physicians in the United States as of November 
2017(Colleges, 2017) 
57.8% 57.8% of physicians work in practices with 10 or fewer 
physicians (Kane, 2017) 
442,238 Total number of physicians in the United States that work 
in a practice with fewer than 10 physicians.  
 
Formula: (.578 * 765,115) 
44,224  Assuming all practices with fewer than 10 physicians all 
have 10 physicians, therefore the maximum number of 
practices with 10 or fewer physicians (i.e.  SHPOs).  
 
Formula: (442,238 / 10)  
1  Fewest number of practices for all physicians that are in 
practices with more than 10 physicians.  
350 Number of audited covered entities that were audited for 
Phase 2 audit protocol per interview with HHS OCR 
(McGee, 2014) 
0.79% The likelihood of being selected for an HHS OCR Phase 2 
Audit Protocol.  
 
Formula: (350/(44,224 + 1)) 
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APPENDIX F: DATA SUMMARY TABLE 
Table 8 - Data summary crosswalk 





Trust IT vendor 










for being secure 
/ compliant 
3 
no -  think for us it is 
having someone who 
is a little bit more 
tech savvy, who 
knows more about 
computers than just 
logging on and 
logging into a system 
and using it; knowing 
the background, 
knowing how the 
basics of a computer 
system work, and 
how VPN and how 
your IP address can 
be vulnerable and 
how things can 
happen. You need 
someone who 
understand that to be 
able to make those 
decisions 
yes- "It is part 
of the 
conversation 
with the IT 
provider when 
we go through 
our reports 
quarterly to 





spam or if it 
was seeing 
someone trying 
to infiltrate our 
system then we 
would change 
it. Our risk 
percentage 
would then go 
up and we 
would have to 















yes- "So I work 
directly with our 
IT company who 
handles our cyber 
security as well" 
yes- "I rely on my 
IT company to 
give me my 
metrics and my 
risk factor, and 
that is what will 
decide whether 
I’m going to 
change or upgrade 
to a different 
product or 
security. It’s 
going to all 
depend on my risk 
factors." 
yes- "It is part 
of the 
conversation 
with the IT 
provider when 
we go through 
our reports 
quarterly to 
look at risk, 
potential risk." 
yes- " I mean, your 




has not only their 
social security 
numbers but it has 
medications" 
"So as long as my 
risk stays at a low 
percentage—we’re 
talking less than a 
5% chance of being 
hacked into or 
someone getting 
into our system" 







yes-"So as long 
as my risk stays 
at a low 
percentage—
we’re talking 
less than a 5% 
chance of being 




tend to leave 
things the way 
they are. " 
" 
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Trust IT vendor 










for being secure 
/ compliant 
5 
yes-  I kind of put 
that trust in there that 
they were going to 





security and just trust 
that was there to start 
with, for me 
personally I don’t 
know the specifics 
and ins and outs that 
would be done on a 
technical level. So I 
wasn’t really 
interested in asking 
those questions to 
make comparisons, 
for me it was more 
about the product 
itself.  
no- 




















get out to the 
public." 




a little bit shady 
and I had 
questions, so I 
kind of put that 
trust in there that 
they were going 
to follow through 




security and just 
trust that was 
there to start 
with, for me 
personally I don’t 
know the 
specifics and ins 
and outs that 
would be done on 
a technical level." 
yes- " I’m sort of 
at the mercy how 
well or how poor 
they are going to 
do their job" 
no- seems on 
cusp though 




I’ve talked to 
them a little bit 
about recently 
but to get that 
done I’ve 
looked at the 
requirements 
which I need 




have a few 
more things 
written down" 
yes- "I would say 
they(sec controls) 
are good, they have 
been effective and 
are currently 
effective the way 
we are using them 
but certainly need 
to be reviewed and 
improved upon." 






plays a very 
important role. 
I think for the 
most part 
everything 




yes- "Really one 









that’s the right 
decision" 
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Trust IT vendor 










for being secure 
/ compliant 
6 
yes- Well with me 
I'm the managing 
partner of course just 
working with our IT 
firm that handles our 
IT part of our 
business and it's 
mostly just working 
with them to ensure 
we are secure as we 
can be and that 
they're safeguarding 
all of our 
information, its not 
too technical what I 
do, I lean a good bit 
on our IT firm to 




"The main we 
one we had 
this last time 


















taking those to 
a secure 
place" 
yes- IT vendor; 
"Again the IT 
firm handles that 
so I trust them" 
"it's just a 
working 
relationship with 
the IT firm 
having 
confidence in 




practices. So we 
stay ahead of any 
kind of security 
risk" 
yes- "the only 
thing you can do 
rely on the experts 
the people who 
who work in this 
field" 
no- yes- always been HIPAA compliant yes- 
yes- "we always 
have to be 
compliant no 
matter what" 
"we have the 
attitude we want 
to be as secure 
and as private as 
we can"  
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Trust IT vendor 










for being secure 
/ compliant 
7 
yes-" I rely a lot on 
my IT vendor I have 
a good relationship 
and trust him to be 
able to help me 
understand. My 
background is 
certainly not in IT" 
no- 
yes- "for me 
the cyber 
security part 







and all that 
stuff." 
yes-"talking to 
my IT person,  he 
doesn’t 
understand the 
billing part of it,  
or a lot of the 
HIPAA part of it,  




yes-" I rely a lot 
on my IT vendor I 
have a good 
relationship and 
trust him to be 
able to help me 
understand. My 
background is 
certainly not in 
IT" 








no- "cyber gets 
kicked to the side 
unfortunately" 
 
"I think your 
questions were 
pretty thorough but 
I guess just just 
like the perspective 
to you know at the 
end of the day it all 
kind of comes back 
to budgeting and 
the financial 
resources too. I’m 
lucky enough to 
work in a 
dermatology group 
that has been very 
successful but 
there’s not a whole 




Derm seems to  be 
excluded from 
some of those 
threats they don’t 
have the resources 
to just function as 
they are much less 
worry about things 
like that if that 
makes sense like 
there are so many 
practices that go 
under because they 
have some sort of 
Medicare lawsuit 
or they just can’t 
pay their staff or 
they are not able to 
purchase an EHR 
and participate in 
that and they keep 
getting the 
reimbursement cut 
no- "Okay I 
personally 
don’t have a 
problem with 




why and I 
understand the 
risk but I think 
it goes back to 
what I was 
saying before 
about how it 
changes it 
involves so 
much it’s not 
just IT it’s I 
think IT in 
general  
information 
security and all 
that technology 
it touches so 
many different 
areas it’s hard 
to I guess keep 
up with it wrap 
my arms 
around it it’s 
not just it 
affects HIPAA 
it affects that , 




affects the staff 
there’s just a 
lot of if that 
changes a lot 
and keeping 
up" 
no- "I’ll tell you 
my doctors are 




security all day 
long you know 
that’s been 
ingrained in 
their brain from 





your risk there 
and avoiding a 
malpractice 
lawsuit from a 
patient or 
referring doctor 
or anything else 
they are worried 
about that kind 





and I just think it 
hasn’t been on 
the forefront of 
anybody’s brain 
for a long time 
in this industry" 
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Trust IT vendor 










for being secure 
/ compliant 
and I think they’re 
so worried about 
all these other 
things that there is 
enough time or 
resources or room 
to worry about 
cyber security until 
all those other 
foundational things 
are stable.  I think 
it kind it goes back 
to psychology class 
I took a while ago 
where are you 
know you don’t 
have a roof over 
your head and food 
to eat you’re not 
really worried 
about some of 
those other things 
until you are stable 
yeah want you get 
a roof over your 
head and you have 
enough to eat then 
you can worry 
about all these 
other things and 
I’m not saying that 
cyber security is 
smaller but in the 
grand scheme of 
things if you can’t 
pay yourself and 
your staff that’s a 
bigger problem 
then if information 
is getting 
compromised so I 
think it is kind 
have to work 
through that in 
order to and that 
health care is so 
tumultuous right 
now and changing 
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Trust IT vendor 










for being secure 
/ compliant 
so much and it’s 
getting harder and 
harder to practice 
independently that 
they never get to a 
point to worry 
about cyber 
security they either 
collapse and fold 
their practice or 
they get bought out 
buy a big system 
that already has 
that stuff in place 
so they never get to 
the point where 
they can actively 
think about it I 
guess my role with 
the derm office I’m 
lucky to work in a 
place that is stable 
financially and 
doesn’t have they 
are starting to feel 
some issues with 
reimbursement but 
they are stable 
enough that I need 
to worry about are 
we going to make 
payroll next time or 
anything like that 
that I can start to 
think about those 
things. that’s the 
only other thing I’d 
say about that is 
that that’s the big 
reason why it’s not 
a priority is that 
there are a lot of 




that they are 
already behind the 
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then they’re always 
worried about these 
other things hey 
what’s the new law 
that passes or a 
new regulation,  or 
is everything else 
we have to worry 
about that cyber 
security gets 
kicked to the side 
unfortunately." 
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yes - I’m 65 years 
old, or soon to be 65 
within about three 
months. I’m not 
electronically very 
savvy. When I was in 
high school, people 
that were taking 
keyboarding weren’t 
going to college, they 
were going into some 
other field. And 
computer labs in the 
colleges were just 
one or two courses. 
So it certainly would 
have probably 
slowed me down 
considerably in 
patient care trying to 
learn all that. 
no- 
yes- "I think 
it’s something 
we talk about 
but we think 
more about 
clinical care 




















"I don’t know 





records I think 




should have a 
better backup 
system to 






fire and flood, 
no- doesn’t use 
vendor or EMR 
no- doesn’t use 
vendor or EMR 
no-"I don’t—










locked in a set 
of record locks 
as well as 
behind a 
separate locked 
office door, as 






guess what you 
could call—we 
have cyber 
security. We use 
strictly paper 
records and they 
are kept very 
confidential, very 
secure, locked in a 
set of record locks 
as well as behind a 
separate locked 
office door, as well 
as locked behind a 
general office door 
every day. " 
 
Interviewer: How 
effective do you 
think your security 
controls are? 
Interviewee: I think 
they’re 100% 
effective.  
no- "I think 
HIPAA has 
utility. It’s 
minimal. It also 
has some 
drawbacks" 




no- "I don’t 
think there’s a 
whole lot of 




break into three 
locks and carry 
out pounds and 
pounds of paper 
information. I 
don’t think it’s 
worth it to them! 
" 
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but its in 
God's hands" 
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you know, say 
there are some 
inactive users 
that, you know, 
we haven’t 
deactivated. So 
we go through 
just a full 
assessment of 
all of our 
equipment and 
try and assess 
what is 
susceptible and 
shore that up. " 
"I generally 
rely on my IT 
guy here that I 
really trust. I 
usually ask 





give me a 
couple of 
vendors and 
the pluses and 
minuses of 
both as well as 
the cost of 
































that. All of the 
employees are 
told not to 
share 
passwords. 
We have, you 
know, a 
handbook that 













no- "I observe 
this gentleman 
every day in his 
interaction with 
the employees. 
You know, I 
think when he 
gives me updates 
or things that he 
identifies during 
his time here they 
generally have 
been right on. I 
keep up with, you 
know—every 
now and then I’ll 
read newsletters 
just enough to be 
dangerous and 
get scared with 
the cyber security 
and all of the 
breaches that are 
out there. And he 
always—if I ask 
him a question 
about them he 
can tell me what 
really occurred 
and why, you 
know, we need to 
be cognizant of it 
and if we are 
subject or 
susceptible to any 
of those attacks 
that have been 
successful.  
You know, it’s 
hard to put your 
finger on it, but 
sometimes you 
can just talk to 
somebody and 
just realize that 
they know what 
they’re doing." 
yes- "I generally 
rely on my IT guy 
here that I really 
trust. I usually ask 




strategy, to give 
me a couple of 
vendors and the 
pluses and 
minuses of both 
as well as the cost 
of each, and then 
we move forward 














you know, say 






we go through 
just a full 
assessment of 
all of our 
equipment and 
try and assess 
what is 
susceptible and 
shore that up.  
So, you know, 







the head of the 
IT security, 
and then we 
develop a 
timeframe to—
you know, if 
something is 
obviously a red 
threat level we 
act on it 
immediately." 
yes- "our mission 
states that, you 
know, we’re going 
to do everything 
we can to secure 
data." 







time and we 
drill, drill, drill 
how important 
it is to secure 
information 
and how 




The HIPAA rule 
has been around 
for quite some 
time and we 
drill, drill, drill 
how important it 
is to secure 
information and 
how privacy of 
our patients’ 
health conditions 
is crucial. And 
that’s not only in 
personal 
communications, 
which is kind of 
what we’ve 
drilled down and 
made sure that 
people 
understand, but 
it’s also in your 
technical 
communications 
and making our 
employees 
aware that, hey, 
you know, don’t 
walk away from 
your screen. You 
know, log off 
when you leave. 
You know, you 
wouldn’t want, 
if it was your 
information, up 
for people to 
casually see. 
You know, just 
trying to put 
yourself in the 
mindset of the 
patient, and just 
an overall 
culture of that.  
yes- "And, you 
know, we’ve had 
people that have 
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just want to 
do—we want 
to be ahead of 
the curve and 
try and make 
it as difficult 
for someone 
that might eye 
our 
organization 
as possible to 
affect us 
negatively. 
So, I mean, 
it’s a little bit 





know, it’s just 
looking at the 
landscape of 
cyber security 
in society and 
trying to beef 
it up as best 
we can for a 
small 
organization." 
not taken that 
directive as 
serious as we 




have very little 
tolerance for that 
type of behavior 
because, you 
know, if your 
patients can’t 
trust you with 
their sensitive 
information 




ingrained in our 
culture from the 
day that people 
are oriented how 
important it is to 
be good 
stewards of the 
data that we 
have." 
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/ compliant 
10 no 
yes- "So the 
way we do it is 
we kind of set 
up a system 
where we have 
different tasks 
involved and 
first you try 




the threats, and 
the risk itself. 
So you want to 
look at the 
















the threat may 
occur, 
determine the 













no- "So it’s 
my job to 
make sure that 
access to the 
IT is always 
safeguarded. 
So I’m the 
one that keeps 
control of the 
keys to the 
server room—
because right 






but, as I 
mentioned, 
we’re going to 
cloud-based. 








for the alarm 
system to 
make sure that 
no one’s 
coming in and 












uses. I keep 
no- "if there’s 
new technologies 
out there then 
we’re going to fit 




make sure that 
you’re protecting 
everything that 
you need.  
And you really 
have to do a lot of 
evaluation. You 
have to reach out 
to different 
resources. 
Certainly your IT 
company should 
be able to provide 
you with a lot of 
that." 
no- "if there’s 
new technologies 
out there then 
we’re going to fit 




make sure that 
you’re protecting 
everything that 
you need.  
And you really 
have to do a lot of 
evaluation. You 
have to reach out 
to different 
resources. 
Certainly your IT 
company should 
be able to provide 
you with a lot of 
that." 
yes- "So the 
way we do it is 
we kind of set 
up a system 
where we have 
different tasks 
involved and 
first you try 




the threats, and 
the risk itself. 
So you want to 
look at the 

















the threat may 
occur, 
determine the 











" I also do the 
yes- "I think the 
hacker’s probably 
our biggest threat. I 
mean, I know that 
our facility is 
secure and I’m not 
worried about that. 
A hurricane is a 
hurricane. They’re 
unpredictable and 
we certainly have 
protocols in place." 
yes- "Nobody 
comes by from 
HIPAA. There 




And the reason 












really sat down 
to consider—




are out there 
that don’t know 
what a security 
risk analysis is? 
" 
yes- "Nobody 
comes by from 
HIPAA. There 
are no HIPAA 
police. they’re 
far understaffed. 
And the reason 




as serious as 
they should until 
you’ve 
experienced it, 
and then once 
you’ve 
experienced it or 
you’ve really sat 
down to 
consider—do 
you know how 
many office 
managers that 
are out there that 
don’t know what 
a security risk 
analysis is? "  
"I went to a 
doctor’s office 
on a visit with a 
family member 
and I was, you 
know, appalled 
at how loosely 
things were 
operated" 
"For us cyber 




of the current 
EMR we use is 
certainly not the 
best. I mean, it’s 
more incumbent. 
It’s a little 
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we live in the 
South, so 
there’s a great 
threat of 
hurricanes and 
that kind of 
stuff. So we 
always have to 
go to an 
emergency 
preparedness 

















of spam and 
what we don’t 
want them to 












analysis for the 
IT system on 
an annual basis 
and do all the 
compliance 
for, you know, 
HIPAA and all 
EMR 
facilitation" 
harder, and we 
know that there 
are other 
programs out 
there that are 
maybe more 




privacy that the 
EMR we use 
does. So for us 
we are more 
concerned with 
protecting the 
integrity of the 
data than we are 
of end user use." 
"You go through 





you know, you 
do hear me refer 
to the budget 
because it can 
get expensive. 
But, you know, 
it’s money well 
spent if you’re 
following what’s 
required of you. 
I mean, in our 
industry your 
data’s got to be 
authenticated. 
You’ve got to 
know that 
what’s being put 
in there is 
actually what 
happened. So we 
try and make 
sure that our risk 
analysis process 
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is ongoing and 
that we’re—you 
know, if there’s 
new 
technologies out 
there then we’re 
going to fit them 
into our budget 
for business 
operations and 
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12 
yes- I’m personally 
not trained in 
technology, so I 
would literally have 
to, you know, rely on 
others’ suggestions 
and then not just 
jump on it right away 
but do some research 
of my own before we 
just go ahead and 
move forward with 
something different 




when it comes 
to like for our 
business, 
yeah, I think 
it’s important 





think about it. 
Not only the 
medical 

















that in my 
eyes is the 
priority. It’s 
our first 






to me because 
I’m really not 
very familiar 




yes - No, I mean, 
just overall, you 
know, being in 
this field it’s what 
you hear, you 
know, and how to 
be, you know, on 
the lookout and 
protecting your 
patients and stuff 
like that. so, you 
know, we had to 
go with 
somebody, and 
then of course 




but, you know, 
other than that 
it’s not like we 
hear a lot about 
cyber security, 
you know. We 
just know 
personally that 
we have to be 
careful with our 
patients’ 
information, you 
know, so how 
we’re going to 
protect and now 
what is the best 
way to do it and 
who do we trust, 
who can we trust? 
And of course 
we, you know, 
met with 
[REDACTED] 
and we heard 
good things about 
them and we 
liked them and 





technology, so I 
would literally 
have to, you 
know, rely on 
others’ 
suggestions and 
then not just jump 
on it right away 
but do some 
research of my 
own before we 
just go ahead and 
move forward 
with something 
different for our 
office, for our 
practice here. 
 




in the office: to 
make sure that 
things run 
smoothly within 
the office. When 
it comes to 
technology and 
cyber security I 
have to—because 
I’m not familiar 
with it I have to 




that they’re doing 
their job. 
no- a MIPS 
based risk 






the org as a 
client. No risk 
analysis on the 
organization is 
performed. 
yes -  Now, if the 
computers are 
running slow or if 
we feel like 
somebody hacked, 
that’s when, you 
know, we start 
thinking about oh, 
shoot, something’s 
happening, you 
know, we need to 
get in touch with 
our IT department 
or, you know, 
cyber, you know, 
security and stuff 
like that. But we 
don’t really—it’s 
not something that 
we think about. 
Now, maybe 
because we’re 
confident that we 
are safe. Although 
you can never be 
too safe, I guess, 
you know. 
no - I’m not 





out. I mean, 
from—again 
I’ve been here 
for a year. I 
mean, it works 
out. You know, 
it’s okay. you 
know, it’s what 
is there now. 
There’s always 
going to be 
adjustments. I 
think it’s been 
a great start of 
it, I guess, I 
don’t know. 
yes- 
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especially, as 
much as it has 
grown, that 
we have to be 
careful with, 
you know. So 
then of 
course, you 
know, you go 
around and 
you have to 
do—I talk to 
the staff here 
and make sure 
that they’re at 
the same—





when it comes 










them now for a 
long time. So it 
kind of fell in like 
that. 
 
Right. Yeah, so 
anyway, so 
there’s a lot of 
things. So 
that’s—you 
know, when it 
comes to cyber 
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14 
yes - I defer a lot to 
them because I’m not 
an IT person, they 
are, and I rely on 
them to make sure 
that everything is 
secure. 
no- 
yes- I mean, 





secret plans as 
far as like 
what we’ve 








private to us is 
that of our 
patients. 
yes- A lot of that 
comes over again 
from IT, you 
know. And we’ve 
been working 
with the same IT 
group for, gosh, 
almost ten years 
and go with their 
recommendations 
of what we need. 
You know, and 
then of course we 
look at costs and 
all of that and if 
it’s over a certain 
threshold we go 
to our board of 
directors, you 
know, to sign off 
on that purchase.  
yes-  I defer a lot 
to our IT 
department. I 
mean, like I said, 
they monitor, they 
make sure that 
they check and 
run for viruses or 
breachments in 
our system, which 
we haven’t had 
any. I defer a lot 
to them because 
I’m not an IT 
person, they are, 
and I rely on them 
to make sure that 
everything is 
secure. 
no-  Okay. So 












How do you 
guys manage 










on a regular 
daily basis. 
yes- I think maybe 
after our 
conversation with 
you and you 
helping to educate 
me a little more I 
could better answer 
that question. But 
as it stands now I 
feel pretty secure. 
no - Well, I 












you know, out 
there for 
everyone to 




anything else I 




some of it be 
unnecessary 
and cost money 
and time that’s 
unnecessary, 
but at the same 
time I think 
what we have 
in place right 
now that’s 
required of us 
is sufficient. 
I’m sure there’s 
room for 
improvement 
in places for 
that but it’s 
important.  
yes- Absolutely, 
yes. And we 
take it very 
seriously. We 
want to be able 
to make sure 
that, you know, 
their identity is 
kept 
confidential, 
they trust in 
us.... So it’s 
important to me 
and my team 
that we keep 
everything in the 
strictest of 
confidence.  
 
